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EDITOR'S NOTE
The four articles contained in this issue of DICTA are papers which were
delivered at the 55th Annual Convention of the Colorado Bar Association in
Colorado Springs. The first two papers were presented as part of the One Year
Review of Colorado Law on October 23, 1953. The following two papers were
presented at a meeting of the Water Law Section of the Association on October
21, 1953. Another paper presented (t this meeting of the Water Law Section
irill be published in the Febritary, 1951 issue- of DICTA.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, ATTORNEYS
AND FAMILY LAW
MAURICE REULER, of the Denver Bar
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES

The several cases decided by our Supreme Court this past year
covering workmen's compensation have fallen into various subtopics, and it will be my purpose to subsume the decisions into
these sub-topics in an effort to put them into sharper focus.
Four cases dealt with the kind of accident which might be
covered in a workman's compensation situation. In the first of
these, Industrial Commission v. Corwin,' the decision of the Supreme Court reversed the finding of the trial court which had
previously set aside an Industrial Commission finding. The Industrial Commission had awarded compensation to a nurse who
alleged she had contracted infantile paralysis while working in the
polio ward of the defendant hospitial. It appeared from the facts
that the claimant had been more or less isolated in the ward for
some two months and had had very little outside contact. Furthermore, of the four nurses working in the ward, two, including herself, had become ill of this disease. The hospital sought to escape
responsibility on the ground that the method of transmission of
polio could not be established, therefore, they could not be held
responsible. Our Court determined that this was a compensible
accident arising out of, and in the course of employment. The
phrase "accidently sustained" means simply that the harm is
unexpected. It does not mean that the harm need be extraordinary.
The Court also notes that the Workmen's Compensation Act is
highly remedial and beneficial in purpose, and should be liberally
construed.
The Court also defines fhe phrase "an accident arising out of
employment" and states that this means "When there is apparent
to the rational mind upon the consideration of all the circumstances
a casual connection between the conditions under which the work
is required to be performed and the resulting injury" an accident
may be said to arise out of employment.
The Court, in a very interesting decision, Billings Ditch Company v. Industrial Commission,2 ruled that an employee of a non'

Colo-.....
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profit mutual ditch company was not covered under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, but was, instead, exempt as an agricultural
worker. This decision reversed both the Industrial Commission
and the trial court's findings. The rationale of the case appears to
be the theory that if the claimant had been working for an individual farmer and was injured while repairing a ditch there
could be no question as to the exemption. Therefore, where farmers ban together to form a mutual company, the stock of which
is owned by themselves so that the company is merely the agency
of conveyance, employees of such company are not covered.
The question was also raised in this case as to whether the
Supreme Court was not bound by the findings of fact made by
the Industrial Commission and confirmed by the District Court.
In overruling this contention, it was determined in accordance
with the general rule that where, as here, the facts are undisputed,
then the issue becomes one of law, and the Court would not be
bound by the findings of fact.
An employee of a paint company who had been calling on
the trade in the northern part of the State was also a hunter.
During pheasant season he went hunting with two employees of
one of his customers. While hunting he was shot in the eye, and
sought to recover for the loss. The Industrial Commission and the
trial court sustained the position of the claimant to the effect
that he was entertaining customers and had, therefore, suffered
an accident arising out of the course of his employment. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that such an undertaking
could not be classified as arising out of the course of employment,
particularly so where it was shown that the claimant had not
taken his customer's employees as guests, but they had all, more
or less, gone out and shared expenses. The Court notes that the
only evidence upholding claimant's position was his own statement.
The Court in determining that such evidence was insufficient stated:
"The preponderance of the evidence must show that the claimant
was performing work connected with his job as hereinbefore outlined." The statement of the claimant being the only evidence in
a case such as this is insufficient to establish a preponderance.
Finally, the Court noted that the accident was simply a risk
common to all hunters and could not be said to be a risk connected
with the claimant's job. In a rather strong dissent, two of the Justices took the position "That the refusal of our court to be governed by findings of fact in this case is indicative of what appears to be a diminishing respect for the adjudication of facts
by trial courts and other finding bodies. Thus the majority opinion
does violence to the elemental rule in proceedings on error that
findings of fact are to be accepted by appellate courts in the absence of a clear showing of error." Aetna Casualty Company r.
Industrial Commission. .,
.... Colo ......
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Lastly, in the cases decided this year, concerned with the
kind of coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act, we
have a precedent making decision, mainly, the University of Denver v. Nemeth.4 Here the claimant was a student at the University
of Denver and was injured during spring football practice. The
facts showed that he received $50.00 per month for taking care
of tennis courts and various other things, but further showed
that he would lose both this and his board and room as well if
he failed to produce on the football team. The Supreme Court
sustained on the following grounds the finding of the trial court
that Nemeth had sustained an injury compensible under our
Workmen's Compensation Act.
(a) That the fact that the University of Denver is an
educational institution does not prevent it from being within
the scope and purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The Court notes that educational institutions today are big
business.
(b) The Court next determines that the claimant, although a part time employee, was still a regular, rather than
a casual, employee and was thus within the terms of the act.
(c) The controlling point in the case is whether or not
"under all of the circumstances the injury arose from something which was incident to the claimant's employment."
Here, says the Court, the claimant had to produce in football or lose his job. While not a direct part of his employment, it was at least incident thereto and therefore arose out
of it. "In the instant case, Nemeth at the time of his injury
was in the employ of the university, was upon his employer's
premises, occupying himself consistently with his contract
of hire in a manner pertaining to or incidental to his employment. * * * The obligation to compensate Nemeth arises
solely because of the nature of the contract, its incidents and
the responsibilities which Nemeth assumed in order to not
only earn his remuneration, but to retain his job. He apparently had the physical ability and aptitude for football, and
the university hired him to perform work on the campus,
and as an incident of this work to have him engage in football."
Parenthetically, it is my opinion that the argument of the
defendant based on public policy, namely, that it is against public policy to require an educational institution to come under workmen's compensation with respect to work scholarships for its
students of whatever kind, should have been sustained as being
sound. There is no doubt that this decision reflects the present
condition existing in college athletics. However, it still seems
novel to me, at least, to render our universities subject to claims
of this sort.
'....

Colo ......
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Three cases cited by our Court were concerned with the problems of evidence. In the first of these, for the first time on appeal
the claimant alleged that both the Industrial Commission and the
District Court had erred when they ignored the undisputed testimony of an expert witness that the claimant had suffered a
psychoneurotic injury. The Court reaffirmed ,the well known rule
that a matter not raised before the Industrial Commission or
the trial court could not be raised for the first time upon appeal.
The Court also points out that in his opinion the evidence of
the expert was not undisputed and that even if it were, it would
not necessarily be conclusive on the fact finding body. Bransall
v. IndustrialCommission.5
The problem of a general finding in a workmen's compensation
case came up in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Commission2 Here the Commission found, so far as the accident was concerned ,"that the claimant sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on July 12, 1951,
and that by reason of such accident he sustained a ruptured intervertebral disc. He left work July 26, 1951, and is temporarily and
totally disabled. His permanent partial disability cannot be determined. His average weekly wages were $59.60." (P. 418). The
Court, in determining that this is an insufficient finding, stated,
in effect, that a general finding on conflicting evidence in a workmen's compensation case where the Court is bound by the findings
of fact of the Commission which are supported by the evidence
that the injury arose out of employment is insufficient to sustain
an award. The proper finding should set out the evidentiary facts,
such as what the claimant was doing, what happened to him,
when the accident happened and the place of the happening. From
these findings the ultimate fact that the accident arose out of and
in the course of the claimant's employment should then be determined. The Court expressly overrules their earlier decisions
which appear to be in conflict with its present ruling.
Next, in dealing with evidential questions, the Court considers a case which arose under the Occupational Disease Act,
Chapter 163, Sessions Laws of 1945. It may be noted that this
is only the second case which has reached our Supreme Court involving this act. Here the claimant alleged that he had contracted
silicosis in the defendant's mine. The evidence indicated that the
only place where claimant was exposed to silicon dioxide was the
employer's mine. The employer sought to deny liability upon the
ground that the act which required that the claimant "establish"
the facts meant that he must prove the facts beyond doubt. The
Court rules that in this, as in other workmen's compensation
and civil cases, the employee must simply prove the facts by a
preponderance of the evidence. The Court also notes, again, that
5...

Colo .. , 251 P. 2d 935, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 9.
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it is ordinarily bound by findings of fact upon disputed evidence.
Resurrection Mining Company v. Industrial Commission.7
In a case considering the problem of jurisdiction under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the Court determined that the
right to appeal from findings of the Commission to District Court
are jurisdictional, cannot be waived and may be raised at any
time. Industrial Commission v. Plains Utility Company.
Finally, the Court, in Pacific Employers v. Industrial Commission,9 ruled that the payment of wages is not ipso facto the
payment of compensation so as to toll the statute of limitations on
the bringing of claims before the Industrial Commission. In this
case, the claimant was injured ofi May 15, 1951. On June 11, 1952,
he filed a claim for compensation. His claim was sustained both
by the Industrial Commission and the District Court upon the
ground that the payment of wages had tolled the six-month statute.
The evidence showed that the employer had made payments after
the injury based on a 40-hour week, although the claimant often
worked 48 or 56 hours. He testified that he thought he was receiving compensation of $21.75, and that his employer was paying
the difference. As the Court points out, this entire evidence was
based on hearsay and was, therefore, incompetent. The Court then
rules "that in order that payment of wages during the absence
of an employee may be held to be the payment of compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act it must be established
by competent evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that in making these payments the employer was doing so
conscious of the fact that he was making the same as compensation and it must be received by the employee with the knowledge
or reasonable grounds for assuming that the payments made to
him were being made as compensation for his injuries." The evidence in the present case did not meet this test. The Court specifically overrules three prior cases which appeared to hold to
the contrary. The Court, again, also states the rule that where
the evidence is uncontradicted it is not bound by any finding of
fact, and the question becomes one of law for it to determine.
The significant statutory changes under the Workmen's Compensation Act are found in Senate Bill 69, which increased the
benefits payable in case of injury or death in the various categories from 50% to 662/1% of the employee's average weekly
wages, not to exceed maximum payments of $29.75 per week, and
a minimum of $10.00 per week. The act has also been amended to
include as an employee of an insured any working partner or individual employer actively engaged in the operation of the business, provided he takes certain steps to become covered. The
Occupational Disease Act has also been amended to bring its
benefits in line with the Workmen's Compensation Act.
- Colo .....
.... Colo .....
... Colo ......
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Attorneys
Under this topic there have been several cases covering different problems in the field. A most significant case arose under
the question of unauthorized practice, and I think we should congratulate our Association for their vigorous efforts along these
lines.
The holding to which I just referred is commonly called the
"pure trust" case, People v. Schmidt.'0 Here the defendant attempted to sell, through contacts and advertising, a legal panacea
which he designated as a pure trust organization. The home office
of this organization was Chicago. The pure trust was created,
according to defendant's literature and statements, through the
signing of a pure trust indenture contract under which the trustor
conveyed his assets to the pure trust for a given period of time
and received in return so-called professional certificates giving
the holder the right to receive profits from the trust, if there
should be any, and the corpus of the trust at the termination date
of the contract creating same. Management was solely in the
trustees, and the trustor has no rights other than those outlined.
This scheme, according to its propaganda, would protect, for
example, a partner from almost any kind of liability or would
enable a person to avoid most estate problems, including tax questions, but would still permit the trustor, if he were setting up an
estate plan, to control the property from beyond the grave. As
a clincher, it was asserted that this organization was a "United
States constitutional procedure," and as foolproof as any organization could be. Mr. Justice Burke, as referee to determine whether
or not this gentleman and his organization were practicing law
without a license in violation of Section 21, Chapter 14, Vol. 2,
1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, pointed out that:
The thing that stands out like a mountain peak in
all this accumulated mass of evidence is that businessmen are not lured into disposing of all control of their
property, of embarking into unheard of schemes to escape personal liability, taxes, court costs, attorney fees,
etc., until they are assured by some reputed expert that
the whole novel plan has been time tested and found
legally water tight. It cannot be doubted that the inducement for the so-called purposes of this service was legal
advice, nothing else, and it makes no difference whether
the Chicago concern was legitimate or otherwise, or
whether its representations were true or false. It was
practicing law in Colorado without authority and defendant was re-enforcing its claims and making representations on his own behalf and his own authority was doing
the same thing both in direct violation of our statutes
and in defiance and contempt of this court.
..... Colo. ..... 251 P. 2d 915, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 9.
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Our Court sustained the finding of the referee and fined the
defendant $500.00, or, in lieu thereof, that he be incarcerated for
90 days in the County Jail of Denver.
The next case which considered the question of unauthorized
practice concerned a public stenographer who advertised in the
telephone directory inter alia "Legal Forms-Depositions, Conveyance Papers." She admitted that she had examined at least one
title and had also prepared a Will. Her sole defense was that she
had no intent to violate the law. The Supreme Court found her
guilty of contempt and engaging in unauthorized practice and
fined her $250.00 or 60 days in jail. People v. Hanna.1
Our Court had next had before it a problem which has been
the bane of many an advocate, namely, how to conduct yourself
in the rare case in which the opposition appears without benefit
of counsel.
In the first of these, Knapp v. Fleming, et al.,'5 the plaintiff
in error, Knapp, appeared pro se in the trial court. Judgment
of dismissal was entered against him and he came by writ of
error to our highest bench. There the Court noted that the writ
must be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules. The Court
stated that while a litigant is permitted to present his own case,
still he should be restricted to the same rules of evidence and
procedure as an attorney; otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded.
Again, in Viles v. Scofield,15 the Court enunciates the principle that "if a litigant for whatever reason sees fit to rely upon
his own understanding of legal principles and the procedures involved in the courts, he must be prepared to accept the consequences of mistakes and errors. One who attempts a major operation without expert knowledge of the precautions essential to
safety cannot be heard to complain if tragedy results."
Finally, there are three decisions directly involving the discipline of attorneys themselves. In the first of these, the Court
points out that it is the duty of the lawyer as an officer of the
court to be absolutely accurate in his statement of facts presented
in his brief in order that the Supreme Court may rely upon them.
Clemann v. Bandimere."4
Again, in Spillane v. Wright," the Court denied a petition
for rehearing, and severely rebuked the attorneys involved. The
Court states: "Silence is sometimes the severest criticism. However, if we remained silent by simply entering an order denying
the petition there would be no indication of our intolerance of a
too prevalent tendency to file argumentative petitions and it
would appear that we condone unfair and unethical practices. As
Colo ......
258 P. 2d 492, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 22.
--Colo......
258 P. 2d 489, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 20.
......
Colo ......
261 P. 2d 148, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 29.
Colo.
, 259 P. 2d 614, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 26.
....
Coo.
259 P. 2d 1078, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 27.
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a further indication of unfamiliarity with or disregard for our
rule this petition (for rehearing) seeks an oral argument which
is specifically prohibited."
Lastly, a most recent case is that of People v. Marshall.16
Here the respondent had been a practicing lawyer of many years
standing in Alamosa. He was disbarred for conduct "highly reprehensible and grossly unprofessional and which has brought reproach upon the honored legal profession to which he belongs."
It was noted by the Court that the respondent had previously
been reprimanded for his conduct, but had appeared apparently
to disregard the reprimands. Judge Steele served as referee, and
his findings were adopted by the Court. The specific grounds
which the Judge found to be cause for disbarment were:
(a) Accepting a retainer but failing to perfect a Supreme Court Appeal in a criminal case for which the retainer had been accepted.
(b) Respondent apparently had converted some thousand
dollars of his client's money to his own use.
(c) That the respondent had failed to return papers or
to institute suits on notes which a client had sought to have
him do.
It should also be noted that our Courts in a most important
step, adopted the Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics with
slight changes in the latter. These are published in September
1953 issue of Dicta.
Family Law
The last topic to which I have been assigned is that of family
law. Again, there may be found under this broad heading several
sub-heads, the cases under each of which will be briefly discussed.
In the first of these, under the general heading of dependency,
we have Everett v. Barry. 17 Here a petition in dependency was
filed on behalf of a maternal grandmother by an attorney who for
filing such was severely rebuked in the following language: "A
petition in dependency must be filed not in behalf of any individual
but only in behalf of the state for the purpose of protecting a
minor child. Such petition should not be filed by any petitioner,
and particularly not by an attorney at law who is an officer of
the court except singly for the protection of a child. It should be
filed only upon credible information and belief that the child is
so circumstanced that for its own protection and well being it
should be taken from existing custody and become a ward of the
state. One assuming to sign such a petition equally assumes the
obligation to present evidence sustaining it and one should not
verify any allegation of such petition as true of his own knowledge
unless the facts set forth therein are within her personal knowl-.-Colo.., 261 P. 2d 719, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1.
-- Colo .... , 252 P. 2d 826, 3952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11.
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edge." (P. 152, 153). The facts showed that the father, a master
sergeant, had always provided a good home for the children and
had always supported them. The children had moved to Denver
with their mother due to her mental condition. This removal had
been instigated by the defendant husband in the hope that she
would be cured. She did improve and her parents sought the custody of the children. In reversing the lower court which had refused to sustain a motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court set out
the rules to govern the actions of Juvenile Courts in dependency
and custody matters. These seven rules are as follows:
1. That the juvenile court is a statutory court with no
jurisdiction beyond that expressly given by statute;
2. That the jurisdiction so given does not include jurisdiction of contests over custody of children in behalf of, or
between, individuals, whether parents, or otherwise;
3. That such jurisdiction attaches only in proceedings
brought, not in behalf of any person, but solely where children
are found delinquent or have been so circumstanced, neglected or imposed upon as to require the state to take over
their custody or act otherwise for their protection;
4. That in a dependency proceeding, such as that befor us, the question to be resolved is not the comparative
rights of different claimants of custody, but solely that of
whether or not the existing custody and surroundings of the
child are such that it is the duty of the state, as parpns
patriae, to take over its custody and make it a ward of the
state;
5. That a dispute between parents or between a parent
and any other person as to right of custody is not such a
controversy as to justify an adjudication of dependency;
6. That a parent, if a fit and suitable person, has the
prior right of custody of his children over a grandparent or
any other person or the state;
7. That a parent is presumed to be a fit and suitable
person to have the custody of his children, and that such
presumption can be overcome only by convincing evidence
to the contrary.
The next case concerning dependency problems is found in
Avery v. The County Court.1 8 Here the Supreme Court sustained
a writ of prohibition in a dependency hearing. The petitioner was
a non-resident of Gilpin County. The defendant mother at the
time the petition was filed raised the question of jurisdiction,
but upon being overruled went to trial. She had been awarded
custody of the child in a Boulder divorce. The Court sets out,
again, the rule that the question of jurisdiction may be raised
at any time. The defect here raised was that the action in dependency was not "filed by any officer of the State Board of Child
11__.Colo ......
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and Animal Protection (an ingenious grouping) or the Juvenile
Court or any person who is a resident of the county having knowledge that the children involved were dependent or neglected"
(p. 58), as provided in Section 3, Chapter 33, 1935 Colorado
Statutes Annotated. The Court rules that where "a statute makes
the residence of a petitioner within a particular county a condition upon which the jurisdiction of a court can be invoked, a
county court is wholly without power or authority to proceed in
a statutory action unless the petitioner is a resident in a county
in which an action is brought."
The Court overrules Hudson v. Mattingley, 69 Colo. 528, 195
Pac. 113 (1921), which had appeared to reach a contrary result
on this question, and states: "Where a statute specifically identifies the officer or persons who may invoke the jurisdiction of a
court in a proceeding which is purely statutory, it is necessary
and essential that the persons thus named shall institute the
proceedings. The identification by the statute of those authorized
to invoke the courts' jurisdiction operates to exclude all persons
not mentioned."
9
In the case of Cederquist v. Archuleta,"
the Court rules that
the Juvenile Court, whose correct title is Juvenile Court in and
for the City and County of Denver and State of Colorado, may
allow support money and medical expenses in a proper paternity
or dependency case, provided that there is evidence as to the
earning capacity of the father and as to the needs of the dependent child, but may not award attorney fees. The Court in reaching
its result calls attention, specifically, to Section 5, Chapter 33,
1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, which provides that at hearings such as these it is the duty of the county or district attorney,
when requested by the Court or the petitioner to appear on her
behalf and present her case. Therefore, if petitioner seeks other
counsel she must pay for it. Also, in this case, the Court again
affirms that Section 1, Chapter 33, 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, requiring a father to support an unborn child and its
mother is constitutional.
0
In the case of Campbell v. Gilliam,"
the trial court had
granted a summary judgment in a dependency proceeding upon
the ground, apparently, that the petitioner did not meet the requirements of the dependency statute with respect to residence.
The facts showed that the petitioner, a neighbor of the defendant at Kalispell, Montana, had become enamored of him, and
that they had had intercourse. Shortly thereafter, she discovered
that she was pregnant, and came to Denver where defendant
was located as a soldier at Lowry Field. He ignored her and she
filed this petition. The trial court, in sustaining the motion for
summary judgment, had also ruled that there was no showing
that the child was dependent or neglected. Our Supreme Court,
.... Colo -..... 253 P. 2d 431, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. ]I.
.%... Colo ...... 257 P. 2d 965, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 21.
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in construing Section 13, Chapter 33, 1935 Colorado Statutes
Annotated, states that the primary purpose of the entire statute
is to provide for the welfare of the child, and that the residential
requirements should be liberally construed so as not to defeat this
purpose. The Court further states that the words of the statute
"for the purpose of this section and other sections codified from
the Act of 1907, the words dependent child or neglected child
shall mean any child under the age of 18 years who is dependent
upon the public for support or who is destitute, homeless or
abandoned or who has not proper parental care or guardianship
or who, in the opinion of the court, is entitled to support or care
by its parent or parents where it appears that the parent or
parents are failing or refusing to support or care for said child,"
indicate that the Court shall have jurisdiction where it appears
that the parent or parents are failing to support the child, and
that, therefore, the granting of the motion for summary judgment was error.
There has been but one case in the past year construing the
sections of our statute concerned with annulments. This case is
an exceedingly important one to the Colorado lawyer in its determination of the question of our Court's jurisdiction and the
kind of action which an annulment is. Owen v. Owen."'
In this case, the plaintiff, as conservatrix, sought to have a
marriage annulled which had been entered into by her ward in
the State of Texas some three years prior to the present adjudication. Personal service was made on the defendant, a Texas resident, in Texas. Defendant, by what he termed a special appearance, moved to quash the service in substance on the ground
that this was not an action in which personal service could be
had on a non-resident. Further, the motion was coupled with a
statement that without waiving it, the defendant moved to dismiss for the reason that the Court had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the complaint. Both motions were denied in
the County Court. From there the case was appealed to the District Court, which sustained the motions and from there the case
came to the Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court determined two
questions of prime significance in this State:
That an annulment is not an action in rem but in
personam. In the case of divorce the marriage status
is the thing or res upon which the court may act. In an
action for annulment on the ground the marriage ceremony was void, the very allegations of the petition preclude the existence of the thing or res.
We appreciate the difference between actions for divorce and annulment. The former being based on a valid
marriage and a cause of divorce arising post nuptially
while the latter presupposes and is based entirely upon
Colo
1.........

257 P. 2d 581, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 19.
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the assumption that by reason of some legal impediment
the parties were incapable of contracting a valid marriage. In other words, in the latter case because of the
legal impediment the attempted marriage is void ab
initio.
The Court having disposed of the question as to the kind
of action thereby sustaining, in effect, the motion to quash on that
point, then rules that the courts of Colorado have jurisdiction
to determine the validitiy of any marriage performed outside
its borders so long as one of the parties is a domiciliary of Colorado, and states the well known rule that the validity of the
marriage is a question to be determined according to the law
of the State in which the marriage was performed. The Court
specifically points out that it will not pass on the question as
to whether defendant waived the validity of his motion to quash
on that point, then rules that the Courts of Colorado have jurisdiction to determine the validity of any marriage performed outside its borders so long as one of the parties is a domiciliary of
Colorado, and states the well known rule that the validity of the
marriage is a question to be determined according to the law
of the State in which the marriage was performed. Finally, the
Court specifically points out that it will not pass on the question
as to whether defendant waived the validity of his motion to
quash and entered a general appearance when he filed a motion
to dismiss along with it.
Next, we have had several cases concerning divorce. Kleiger
v. Kleiger reaffirms the general proposition that the question of
alimony and the propriety of a property settlement is generally
within the discretion of the trial court, and that where the petitioning wife knew the facts, she could not later attempt to
upset a property and alimony division. It is my thought that this
decision illustrates that the rule in the Bartges case fortunately
cannot be applied to every divorce settlement. U. S. National Bank
V. Bartges, 120 Colo. 317, 220 P. 2d, 600; 122 Colo. 546, 224 P.
2nd, 658.
Perhaps the most significant single case decided in the field
of divorce within the past year is that of Burke v. Burke.2" In 1925
the plaintiff was awarded a divcrce from the defendant and was
given $30.00 per month for support of her minor child. The defendant, for a time, complied with the Court order as to support,
but later moved to another state and failed to make any further
payments. In 1951, the wife applied to the Court to reduce the
child support arrearages to judgment. This was done without
notice to the defendant, the Court entering judgment for the arrearage plus simple interest. The husband then entered his appearance and moved to vacate, which motion, after full hearing, was denied. In sustaining the position of the trial court, our
-...

Colo .....
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Supreme Court holds that under Section 18, Chapter 56, 1935
Colorado Statutes Annotated, execution, property division or imprisonment are proper remedies to enforce child support payments. The Court also notes that these remedies are cumulative
rather than mutally exclusive and states: "Each installment which
matures under a decree which has not been modified becomes a
judgment debt similar to any other judgment for money." (P. 249).
Thus, the Court states that each amount as it becomes due is a
separate judgment debt, and that a consolidated judgment for
arrearage is proper as is the award of simple interest. The Court
also rules that the fact that marriage is a civil contract does not
bring this action within the statute of limitations respecting debts
arising from contracts, and finally states that at least in this case
it was in error to fail to give notice.
In another important decision, People v. The District Court,2
the Court rules that an interlocutory decree, although containing
a statement that plaintiff and defendant were bona fide residents
of Colorado for more than one year last preceding the institution
of the cause of action, as well as being bona fide residents of
Rio Grande County for the same year, and although the complaint contained the same allegation, that these were insufficient
to sustain an interlocutory decree of divorce entered where the
undisputed testimony given subsequent to such entry showed
that neither plaintiff nor defendant were residents of Rio Grande
County but were, in fact, residents of Denver County, and that
defendant had simply been served in transit to Denver. The Court
states that all orders entered in this cause are void because, pursuant to Chapter 56, Section 6, 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated,
divorce actions can only be brought in the county where the
plaintiff resides or where the defendant resides or where the defendant last resided, unless such can be shown the Court had no
jurisdiction and can enter no orders. Under this ruling perhaps
a court would not have jurisdiction to grant a change of venue
in such a case. Counsel caught in this predicament should possibly seek prohibition.
Several miscellaneous cases have come up under the general
topic of family law, and I am only briefly going to mention them,
since they are not too important.
The first is Thuet v. Thuet,2 4 which holds inter alia that a
wife may convey her land without her husband's knowledge or
consent and that such conveyance, if meeting the other requirements of conveyancing, are proper.
In Franzen v. Zimmerman,2 the plaintiff, a widow, sought
to recover for loss of consortium when her husband was injured
in an auto accident from which injuries he subsequently died. The
Colo ......
S... Colo ......
.... Colo ......
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Court states that at common law the wife could not maintain such
action, but it is urged that married women statutes permit such.
The Court indicates that this type action may be maintained where
there is an interference with such rights resulting from intentional
malicious or direct act by another, but that no such action can
be maintained for indirect, remote or consequential loss.
Finally, the Court says that while the present case might
present some difficulty, it is governed by Giggey v. GallagherTransportation Company,26 which denied the right to recover for loss
of consortium based on the negligent actions of a third person.
In closing it may be noted that the statutory enactments covering family law do not appear to be important.
20

101 Colo. 258, 72 Pac. 2d 1100 (1937).

VAN CISE ON RULE ELEVEN
This Rule of Civil Procedure is the same both in United States
and Colorado Courts. It is very frequently disobeyed by lawyers
and the Courts should begin to enforce the penalties for such action.
The pertinent portions are:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address and that of the party shall
be stated. * * * The signature of an attorney constitutes
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay. * * * For a wilful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action.
One of the most flagrant violations by attorneys is entering
Counsel's appearance by a false Motion to Dismiss "for the reason that the Complaint fails to state a claim against the defendant
upon which relief can be granted." This is most frequently filed
against a good Complaint in Divorce and very often against good
complaints in other cases. When so filed the attorney so doing
knows that it is ,absolutely untrue.
When the attorneys are trying to work out a settlement of a
case all that counsel should do is to enter his appearance for the
Defendant, then no action can be taken without notice to them.
But to file an untruth is a grave reflection on the lawyer and
should not be allowed by the Court.
PHILIP S. VAN CISE
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CRIMINAL LAW
WILKIE HAM
of the Lamar Bar

Of the dozen criminal cases decided by the Colorado Supreme
Court since September, 1952, including McBride v. People,' four
cases involved confidence game and in three the decision of the
lower court was reversed. This ratio shows the importance of confidence game in our criminal law and the uncertainty as to just
what is confidence game in Colorado.
The Supreme Court in Lindsay v. People,2 decided in. 1949,
held that a defendant was not guilty of confidence game who received money on a check on an existing bank in Sterling, Colorado,
dated January 8, 1947, when the account had been closed approximately three months prior thereto. The defendant said nothing
about whether or not the check was good, and other similar transactions of various small amounts had occurred about the same time
at different places.
The Court said, page 253, "to eliminate further doubt and to
clear the course of prosecuting officers hereafter this court now
says that the making and passing of a check as in the instant case
is not within the meaning of the terms false or Bogus checks as set
out in Section 222."
The Supreme Court in Chasse v. People," decided at the same
term of court as the Lindsay case, affirmed a conviction of confidence game where the defendant obtained from the Brown Palace
Hotel $20.00 on a check drawn on a non-existing bank in Detroit.
The defendant, after arrest, admitted that he had never had an
account in any bank in Detroit, and that he had no information
at the time he wrote the check that any such bank existed. Although he had given a Detroit address, he did not know whether
such street or number existed. The defendant contended that since
he had obtained the money solely by the use of a false or bogus
check, the judgment could not stand. The court said, at page 163,
that the statute is violated "if the money is obtained solely by the
use of a false or bogus check." Another check was received in
evidence for the same amount to show a scheme or plan.
The Court said, at page 162, the statute may be violated by
any one of three methods, i. e., brace faro, bogus check, or confidence game.
In McBride v. People,4 the defendant opened an account on
October 29 in a Boulder bank with a deposit of $55.00. On the
same day he drew out $35.00 and later drew out small amounts
reducing his balance to $12.42 by Nov. 3. He only made the original
deposit. On Saturday afternoon, November 3, he cashed a check
1126 Colo. 277, 248 P. 2d 725 (
).
2119 Colo. 248, 202 P. 2d 951 (1948).
'119 Colo. 160, 201 P. 2d 378 (1948).
'Note 1 Supra.
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for $65.00 at a grocery store. This check, exhibit "A" was the
basis of the confidence game charge. He had also given a $40.00
check at this same market on October 30, and it was outstanding.
When the defendant cashed the $65.00 check, he was not questioned
about his bank account or asked if his check was good, but it was
cashed without hesitation. The same Saturday afternoon or evening, he cashed three other checks in the amount of $50.00, $20.00
and $30.00. In cashing all of the checks, he represented that he
needed the money to get his wife out of the-hospital. He immediately thereafter drove to Boulder, met his wife and went to Kansas City, where he was arrested six weeks later.
The defendant contended that the check was neither false nor
bogus, that it was a genuine check drawn on an existing bank in
which the defendant actually had an account and that it bore his
own and not a fictitious signature.
The Court said at page 284, "A check calling for $65.00 upon
a bank wherein the maker knows he has less than $20.00 on deposit and intends to put no more in, is as false and bogus as any
check could be."
The Court said at page 285 as to whether the defendant resorted to any fraudulent scheme by which he sought to obtain the
confidence of the complaining witness and as to whether the complaining witness reposed any special confidence in the defendant;
that
The.giving of the check implied that the maker had
funds in the bank upon which it was drawn to cover it.
That his signing and tendering the same was as much a
representation of its worth as would have been his oral
assurance of its payment had he been directly questioned specifically in that regard.
The Court said, at page 286, his representation of need for
cash (to obtain his wife's release from the hospital), on this Saturday evening might have prompted granting his request. He probably needed the cash for that purpose, but this was only a half
truth. He failed to reveal to his victim that he had insufficient funds
in the bank. Neither did he reveal that he contemplated leaving
the state immediately without intention of returning or leaving a
forwarding address. He put his money raising campaign into operation on Saturday afternoon when the bank was closed. The
situation is such that the issue becomes solely one of intent.
The Court further said, at page 286, it is true that all short
checks are not false and bogus checks within the meaning of the
confidence game statute and that it takes more than merely a
short check to constitute the offense. 5 Each case must be determined
upon the facts presented, and in the Lindsay case it is apparent
that no representations were made and nothing by way of inducement said to the taker of the check to cause him to cash it.
People v. Lindsay, 119 Colo. 248, 202 P. 2d 951 (1948).
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The Court said further in the McBride case, page 286, the
primary issue in prosecution under the statute is the intent of
the defendant by deliberate plan, scheme and design and by means
of such (known to him to be) worthless, false and bogus check, to
trick, cheat and swindle another of his money or property.
In the case of Graham v. People,6 the defendant made a contract with the Trinidad Boys Club to sponsor a donkey show and
received money on account of this contract. The Supreme Court
said, at page 353-354, that the People make no contention that
the newspaper clippings and letters presented by the defendant'
(as endorsement of his show) were false or bogus, and there is
no dispute that the donkey show was in existence. Nothing with
reference thereto was false or bogus. The Court said at best the
evidence showed a breach of contract due to financial difficulties.
In White v. People,7 the defendant by various false representations and the pawning of a watch obtained a loan of $20. The Court'
said, page 638, quoting from People v. Dolph,8 there can be no
doubt concerning the law in this jurisdiction as to whether a bogus
or false instrument, token, or device is essential to establish the
guilt of an accused upon a charge based upon the confidence game
statute. "We have held repeatedly that mere words are not sufficient
to warrant a conviction under that statute. To constitute the offense
the money must have been obtained or the attempt thereto made
by some false or bogus -means, token, symbol or device as distinguished from (words), however false and fraudulent. Here
the watch itself was not bogus. The uncontraverted evidence was
that it had a retail value of $29.75."
In the case of Lane v. People,9 decided May 11, 1953, the Court
said it was not confidence game, but the facts showed the establishment of a debtor and creditor relationship.
The Supreme Court in People v. Lindsay,0 stated that our
confidence game statute is identical in its terms with the Illinois
statute. The Illinois Statute 11is as follows:
Every person who shall obtain or attempt to obtain
from any other person or persons money, property or
credit by means or by use of any false or bogus check or by
any other means, instrument or device commonly called
the confidence game shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than ten years.
(The words brace faro are not in the Illinois Statute.)
Under that statute the supreme court of Illinois holds that
the defendant is guilty of confidence game even though he uses
no bogus or false instrument, token or device. 12
'126 Colo. 351, 248
'126 Colo. 365, 249
'124 Colo. 553, 239
-........
Colo .......
257
"119 Colo. at page
Chap. 48, Illinois
'People v. Rogers,

P. 2d 730 (1952).
P. 2d 823 (1952).
P. 2d 312 J(1951).
P. 2d 578 (1953), 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 21, p. 331.
252.
Rev. Stat., Sec. 256.
375 Illinois 54, 30 NE 2d 77 (1940).
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The Illinois Supreme Court stated in that case that the gist
of the crime of confidence game is obtaining the confidence of the
victim by some false representation or device. The statute was
designed to reach the class of offenders known as confidence men
who practice swindling schemes as various as the mind of man
is suggestive. It covers any scheme whereby a swindler fraudulently wins the confidence of his victim and then swindles him
of his money or property by taking advantage of confidence fraudulently obtained. If the transaction is a swindling operation, it is
immaterial that the form assumed is that of a lawful business
transaction.'-"
The crime of obtaining money or property by means of confidence game is committed
whenever money or property is obtained
4
by a bogus check.1
Without undertaking to analyze the various decisions of the
Colorado Supreme Court (and they are based on Colorado precedent), it is submitted that the matter should be defined by the
legislature so the more desirable construction placed on the similar
statute by the Illinois courts will obtain and include that vast
field of swindling schemes where no false token is used and also
include a bogus check where the account is closed or no account
or on a non-existing bank regardless of whether there are any
fraudulent verbal representations.
The case of Wesner v. People 15 involved the taking of indecent liberties with a seven year old child. The Court held that
even though the court did not sufficiently examine the child to
determine competency prior to permitting her to testify, if the
testimony disclosed on the whole that she was qualified no prejudice occurred.
The Court also held that it was proper to show that the same
defendant with the same seven year old girl engaged in the same
offense five or six days after the crime was committed. The Court
said at page 405, where the facts of the subsequent similar offense
point to intent, scheme, design and plan, and are not too remote,
such evidence is admissible.
The Court also said, page 405, in sexual criminal offense, such
as we have before us, it is not so much the matter of revealing
the plan, scheme or design and intent of the normal mind with
criminal tendencies as it is to establish the unfortunate sexual
perversions of the person charged.
In Hahn v. People 16 the defendant was charged and convicted
of receiving stolen goods. He was also charged with being an
habitual criminal. After conviction he pleaded guilty to the habitual
counts. He waived pre-sentence investigation. No motion for new
trial was filed, but a petition was filed to vacate the sentence im13People v.
14 People v.
1126 Colo.
16126 Colo.

Martin, 372 Illinois 484, 24 N.E. 2d 380 (1939).
Cathony, 376 Illinois 260, 33 N.E. 2d 473 (1941).
400, 250 P. 2d 124 (1952).
451, 251 P. 2d 316 (1952).
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posed on the defendant. He contended that the counts mentioned
in the habitual criminal charge were not proved to be felonies. The
Supreme Court held that where the counts alleged that the counts
committed in other jurisdiction were felonies a plea of guilty waived
proof as to the averments in the counts and need not be proved.
In the case of Eckhardt v. People 17 a prosecution witness refreshed his memory by reference to a memorandum. It was prejudicial error for the court to refuse defendant counsel the opportunity of inspecting the memorandum for the purpose of cross-examination. The Court said that was the first time that point had been
before the Court.
In the case of Heinze v. People,18 the defendant was charged
in one count with driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and with having been previously convicted of a similar offense. The defendant pleaded not guilty and then made a motion
to quash because of improper joinder. The lower court overruled
the motion. The Supreme Court held that while the motion was
untimely, it was the duty of the court to require that the matter
of the former conviction be stated in a separate count, and the
court held that it was prejudicial error to establish the former
conviction before any proof as to the substantive offense. The fact
that the defendant took the witness stand and invited crossexamination as to prior convictions did not cure the error of
charging the former convictions in the same count and proceeding
immediately to the proof of the former conviction.
The Court said that the accepted procedure in other jurisdictions was to withhold consideration of the additional counts until
disposition had been made of the substantive count, as is done in
habitual criminal procedure.
Shore v. District Court 19 held two informations where different defendants were accused of distinct crimes cannot be consolidated for trial over the objection of any defendant, even though
the evidence to be produced would show that the charges were
based on the same set of circumstances. The Court said also in
this case that a writ of prohibition was the correct procedure.
In Ridley v. Young 20 the defendant in an interrogatory before
trial admitted he was driving the automobile. At the trial, the defendant did not appear, but his answer to interrogatory was introduced in evidence, and the Court ruled that this interrogatory could
be contradicted. The Supreme Court held that under the rule any
matter that is testified to may be contradicted by evidence. The
court said that there were two kinds of admissions-judicial admissions and otherwise. Judicial admission is conclusive but another admission is not conclusive, and evidence may be introduced
to contradict.
" 126 Colo. 458, 250 P. 2d 1009 (1952).
------Colo -.----253 P. 2d 596 (1953), 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12, p. 167.
.......... Colo ......... 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 22, p. 340.
-...... Colo .......... 253 P. 2d 433, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12, p. 164.
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WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT TO NON-TRIBUTORY GROUND WATERS IN COLORADOLANDOWNER OR APPROPRIATOR?
CLYDE 0. MARTZ
Associate Professor of hai, University of Colorado

I am flattered by the opportunity your chairman has given
me to participate in the program of this highly important and
reputable water section of the Colorado Bar Association. I would
like to think that the invitation was prompted by his belief that
I might have something worthwhile and interesting to say. But
I know it to be a fact that in his desire to save his flock from the
usual bloodshed that accompanies these gatherings, he looked to
me, a representative of the state university, as his one safe choice,
free of factional ties and territorial loyalties, and fair game for
you rapier minded veterans of many a water battle to draw and
quarter in the sport of the morning. His precaution was unnecessary. For while the subject of today's program is a controversial
one, it is unique in the ever controversial water law field in that
the multiple points of view which it raises do not represent territorial differences. His ambush, I have hoped to avoid by stacking
the rostrum with John Clayton of Greeley and Ray Moses of Alamosa, men I will be confident to pit against the deans among you
in any jousts that follow our remarks.
As you all know, in eighty years of water resource development in this state, almost no attention has been given by our courts
and legislature to the nature of private rights to percolating ground
waters that do not flow in any well defined channel and which
are not demonstrably tributory to surface or underground natural
streams. In the early days landowners drilled many wells, principally for domestic uses, without claiming appropriation rights
in the underground aquifers on the basis of their priority of use.
There seemed to be an abundance of water for all their present and
contemplated future uses. It is safe to assume from the absence
of filings, the absenee of adjudications of priorities and the absence of any legislation limiting or apportioning ground water uses
that the majority believed that the common law gave them rights
to such waters incident to the title to their lands.
But in the last fifteen years, as ground water uses have rapidly
increased, have produced overdrafts upon many aquifers with
low annual rates of recharge and have begun to lower water tables
to the injury of existing wells, the lackadaisical unconcern of well
users about the protection of their sources of supply and priorities
of right has undergone quite a change. R.E.A. has brought inexpensive power to rural areas and has made possible large scale
pumping operations for irrigation uses. New lands are being irrigated by ground waters remote from stream sources, and many
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who have stream appropriations are sinking wells on adjoining
lands to get a more dependable supply. Conflicts in interests are
becoming increasingly acute and claims are being openly asserted
to water rights, in some cases on the basis of priority of use, and
in others on the basis of situs of land holdings over ground water
aquifers. Pumpers are swamping the state engineer's office with
filings on purported appropriations.
In response to these claims, the Honorable Paul Littler held
an adjudication in 1948 in the District Court of Mesa County on
waters found by him to be part of an artesian basin not tributory
to any stream. Motions to dismiss, filed on the grounds that the
court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate these waters, were denied,
the judge concluding that the Supreme Court had early held that
common law doctrines whether relating to surface or percolating
ground waters have never been applicable in Colora.do and that
this was true even before the Constitution, and separate and apart
from any legislation. He limited the decisions, however, to artesian waters on the basis that they were similar to the springs
which may be appropriated under the waste, seepage, and spring
water statute. (Discussed 26 Dicta 92.) The case was not appealed. This year the Honorable Henry S. Lindsley, sitting in
Conejos County took the contrary position and ruled in the case of
Thomas v. Brady that in the absence of a contitutional or statutory
dedication of these waters to public use, they must be governed
by the common law reasonable use or correlative rights doctrines.
Concurrently with this action, however, another adjudication was
started in District 3 under the direction of the Honorable Claude
C. Coffin. My colleagues will give you on-the-spot reports of the
circumstances leading to these current proceedings and the points
of view and reactions of the people in the affected areas. I will
try to lay a foundation for their remarks by reviewing the present
status of the law, outlining the several alternatives open to our
court and considering some of the obstacles the alternatives present
to the administration of an effective ground water appropriation
law.
Art. XVI, Sec. 5, of the Colorado Constitution declares that
the water of every natural stream is the property of the public,
rather than the property of riparian landowners, and makes such
waters the subject of appropriations. The Supreme Court, conforming to the appropriation philosophy of the state, has given
the phrase "natural stream" a liberal construction. It has confirmed appropriations under this section to the sublow of surface
streams Buckners Irr. Mill & Imp. Co. v. Farmer's Independent
Ditch Co.,' to underground streams, the channels of which can be
distinctly traced Medano Ditch Co. v. Adams, 2 and to percolating
waters which are sources of supply of surface or underground
131 Colo. 62, 72 P. 49 (1902).
2 29 Colo. 317, "68 P. 431 (1902).
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water courses Safranek v. Limon,' and Dalpez v. Nix.4 But even
a liberal construction will not stretch the phrase "natural stream"
to cover waters which are not tributory to either surface or underground channels. The Constitutional dedication has been supplemented by statute, 5 which subjects to appropriation non-tributory waste, surface and spring waters to the extent such waters
are not needed by the owner of the land where they arise. This
section does not cover percolating ground waters, though it was
suggested in the Mesa County adjudication that wells in artesian
basins were essentially the same as springs and might be brought
under this statute by construction. Even if so construed, however, the statute would not give an appropriator of ground waters
a paramount right to the man who could drill a well on his own
land. Rights to non-tributory ground waters do not therefore stem
from either constitutional or statutory provisions but must rest
upon the common law applicable to this jurisdiction. That much
is clear. But the uncertainties which are evidenced by the conflicting views of our judges arise from an absence of reliable guides
as to which of four possible common law rules-absolute ownership, reasonable use, correlative rights and appropriation-is applicable in Colorado.
The absolute ownership doctrine stems from the English case
of Acton v. Blundell 6 and has general application in England,
the Eastern states, and, at one time, in a sizable number of the
arid western states. It regards the percolating waters as part of
the land in which they are found, and, pursuant to the ad coelum
maxim, gives the surface owner an unqualified right to pump the
water for use on his own land or as a commodity in trade. Injury
to his neighbor, except as it may be caused maliciously, is regarded
as damnum absque injuria. Under this view the water right is a
vested property interest, not dependent upon use and beyond the
power of the legislature to limit or destroy by regulatory conservation measures without just compensation to the user.
Although this doctrine has not positively been eliminated as
a possibility in Colorado since strong and long standing local customs supporting it may still be shown, and if shown, would be
persuasive on our court, it appears to be running such a poor
fourth that it calls for no extensive consideration today. Notwithstanding statements in some of the early cases such as Bruening v. Dorr 7 that percolating water existing in the earth belongs
to the soil, is -apart of the realty and may be used and controlled
to the same extent by the landowner, the court in the recent case
of Safranak v. Limon, supra, has declared: "We have long since
departed from the English common law doctrine of ownership of
3123 Colo. 33'0, 228 P. 2d 975 (1951).
496 Colo. 540, 45 P. 2d 176 (1935).
'COLO.

STAT. ANN.,

C. 90, §§ 20, 21 (1935).

12 Mees & W 324.
23 Colo. 195, 47 P. 290 (1896).
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percolating waters by the surface owner. . . . Whether in such
case [the case of non-tributory waters] 8 we should follow the
California doctrine of reciprocal rights, developed from its law
of riparian rights, or whether we should extend one step further
our Colorado doctrine of first in time, first in right, need not now
be determined.
Reasonable use is likewise an ownership doctrine, but recognizes reasonable limitations upon the landowners' exploitation
rights. It permits him to take all the water he can use for reasonable beneficial uses upon his land, but outlaws, as unreasonable,
diversions to lands outside the source basin. It sets no quantitative limits, however, on individual use and allows pumpers to
exceed the annual rate of recharge with impunity. In those areas
of water scarcity that are committed to an ownership doctrine by
statute or prior decision, this view has been gaining support. For
unlike the absolutist doctrine, it tends to assure beneficial and
non-wasteful use of a limited source of supply. Even under a
statute declaring the proprietor to be the owner of waters percolating through his land, the Oklahoma court, prompted by these
conservation objectives, has forbidden him to waste his waters
and has limited him to reasonable uses upon his own land. Canada
v. City of Shawner.9
Support for this doctrine may be found in Colorado, first,
from the fact that it has a substantial following in states similar
to ours, where common law proprietary rights may have arisen
from long usage, but must now be curtailed to some extent in order
to preserve a dwindling natural resource; second, from the fact
that our court has recognized that other fugacious substances,
namely, oil and gas, are owned in place by overlying landowners;
third, by the approbation given by our legislature in the waste
seepage and spring water statute to a comparable right of the
proprietor of land to recapture non-tributory waters arising
thereon, for, but only for, reasonable uses upon his own land;
and finally, by the fact that the people of the state for some
eighty years have probably assumed that they had some sort of
proprietary interest in the waters that was incident to their
rights in the soil. These customs have played an important part
in the determination of water right, as the birth of the appropriation doctrine itself bears witness. Again in Bristor v. Cheatham, the Arizona court, upon rehearing a decision in which it had
recognized an appropriation doctrine, reversed itself on the grounds
that water users had relied for so long a time upon their ownership rights that it would not be proper to change the rule at this
late date. In the Sefranak v. Livmon case, our court seemed to
ignore the American reasonable use doctrine as a possibility for
Colorado, suggesting that the alternatives for non-tributary ground
Explanation supplied by Author.
'179 Okla. 53, 64 P. 694 (1937).
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waters are correlative rights or appropriation. Its statements
were, however, only dicta and were disregarded by the Honorable
Henry S. Lindsley in the recent Conejos County proceeding, where
he said the reasonable use doctrine should be the rule of that case.
Were this doctrine ultimately to receive the blessings of our
highest court, I foresee serious consequences. In the first place, I
have grave doubts that it could ever be displaced, either by statute
or constitutional amendment, by a priority system or any other
system designed to curb overdrafts from and the ultimate exhaustion of many ground water reservoirs. For the right of each
landowner to present and future beneficial uses of his ground water
supply vested in him at the date of his patent and is neither
limited nor lost by the insignificance or absence of past pumping
operations. That statutory or constitutional limitations upon these
rights would rest on thin ice was indicated by our court in
Strickler v. Colorado Springs, where it was said: "Art. XVI, sec. 5
and 6, (implementing the rule of priority for natural streams) are
not intended to affect and do not affect prior vested rights, but all
owners of such rights are entitled to compensation therefore before the same can be taken or injuriously affected." [states such
as Wyoming which recognizes this rule have been unable to do
more in their ground water codes than to require the filing of
drilling information and the elimination of waste.] Even if an
appropriation law, operating prospectively only, could be superimposed for conservation purposes upon such a proprietary system, we would face the confusion that has been inherent in the
California dual system of water rights, a confusion which we have
successfully avoided to date by strict adherence to the appropriation, and renunciation of riparian principles with respect to other
waters of the state. Finally, under this view it is clear that the
landowner has no property rights to the ground water level. So
long as water is put to reasonable uses upon lands overlying the
aquifer, competing pumpers can mine the source without liability
and ultimately exhaust those aquifers with low annual rates of
recharge. Being merely a modification of the absolutist doctrine,
reasonable use has many of the same shortcomings, and should be
recognized only if the state is already committed to an ownership view and must make the best of it.
The correlative rights doctrine championed only by California
is merely an application of riparian law to ground waters. It regards all landowners who overlie an aquifer as joint tenants and
allows each a reasonable proportion of the annual recharge for
beneficial uses upon his own land. Any operation which lowers
the water table or which transports water beyond the source basin
is unreasonable per se and may be enjoined at the suit of injured
tenants. Accordingly, it places quantitative limits upon the right
a landowner would enjoy under the reasonable use doctrine.
Colorado has consistently rejected riparian law applications
to surface waters and to underground streams. It has avoided thus
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far the difficult administrative problems, which have long plagued
the California court in its attempt under this doctrine to define
the proportionate interests of overlying owners and the prescriptive rights of those who have effected a reduction in the water table.
Superimpose on this system an appropriation doctrine for surplus
waters, as California has done, and you have hopeless confusion.
Only the very hardy, I believe, can read Pasadena v. Alhambra,1adjudicating the rights of overlying owners, claimants of prescriptive rights and appropriators to the waters of the Raymond
Basin in California and still propose this doctrine for Colorado.
Yet the court in Safranek v. Limon suggested this as the only
alternative to appropriation.
A final possibility for our court and one I hope it will elect
is the principle of appropriation. Rights based upon priority of
use can exist and indeed have been held to exist in this and other
states in the absence of any constitutional or statutory dedications.
Idaho has subjected ground waters to appropriation by force of
the common law alone. Hinton v. Little." Utah sampled both reasonable use and correlative rights doctrines till 1935 when the
court swept away all proprietary rights and held the rule of appropriation to have been law from the start.' Precedent exists for
similar action in Colorado. In the case of Coffin v. Left Hand
Ditch Co.,13 our court speaking many years ago of surface streams
but in words which would be equally applicable to ground waters
said:
It is contended that the doctrine of priority was
first recognized and adopted in the Constitution. But we
think the latter doctrine has existed from the date of the
earliest appropriations of water within the boundaries of
the State. The climate is dry and the soil when moistened
by usual rainfall is arid and unproductive. Artificial irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity. . . . The
right to water in this country, therefore, by priority of
appropriation, we think it is and always has been the duty
of the national and state governments to protect. Snyder
v. Colorado Gold Dredging Co., 181 Fed. 62; Fort Collins
Milling Co. v. Larimer Irri. Co., 61 Colo. 45, 156 Pac. 140.
The appropriation doctrine for ground waters has a full
measure of rational and judicial support. First, it is the only
common law doctrine that will preserve uniformity in our surface
and ground water administration and apply a basic water policy
throughout the State. In deciding that percolating waters were
appropriable in Utah, the United States Supreme Court in Snake
1033 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P. 2d 17 (1949).
"50 Idaho 371, 296 P. 582 (1931).
"Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755 (1935).
"6

Colo. 443 (1882).
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Creek Tunnel Co. v. Midway Irr. Co. 14 looked to the policy of the
state as evidenced by its court decisions. The President's Water
Policy Commission in 1950 concluded that percolating waters were
subject to appropriation in Colorado because of the state's traditional appropriation policy. Professor Kirkwood, a well-known
California water authority recently emphasized the importance
of a uniform state water policy by saying that the principle justification for the correlative rights doctrine in California lies in the
fact that it applies the same principal to ground water that the
state's dual water system applies to surface and underground
streams. 15 By the same sound rationale only the appropriation
doctrine is fitted to the needs of a Colorado doctrine state.
Secondly, proprietary rights, even if recognized, are of relatively little value in this state. Colorado has few impervious basins
with respect to which it can be said that the waters contained
therein will never reach a surface or underground channel. And
our court has made it virtually impossible for the landowner to
show the existence of such basins by raising a presumption that all
waters are tributary-a presumption that can only be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence of dikes and other barriers to
movement. 16 In basins where proprietary rights are asserted today,
it is likely, with the steady increase in our knowledge of ground
water movements that appropriation rights will be asserted in the
future. Thus, only those pumpers who have established priorities
of right by actual use are secure against encroachment by future
appropriators of tributary waters. In the few impervious basins
where proprietary rights might exist, uncontrolled pumping will
eventually exhaust the supply and the proprietors will be left with
naked rights to extinct or at least high production cost aquifers.
Thirdly, appropriation of ground waters has been likened to
the rule applicable to developed waters. Where a man developed a
new source of supply and adds new water to a stream, he is recognized by a long line of cases as the appropriator of the source,
Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter.17 The well driller in an impervious basin also develops a new source of supply. By analogy
he should be allowed to adjudicate the priority of his right and
was so privileged in the Mesa County adjudication of 1948.
Finally, judicial recognition of a common law appropriation
doctrine is absolutely necessary to sustain comprehensive conservation legislation designed to preserve usable water tables and
protect existing investments in water supplies in critical areas.
Antipathy to the priority rule for ground water appears to
rest first upon a fear that such appropriations would be sub"260 U. S. 596, 43 S. Ct. 215.
1 Stan. L. Rev. 9.
'*
Safranek v. Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P. 2d 975; DeHaas v. Benesch, 116
Colo. 344, 181 P. 2d 453.
"757 Colo. 31, 140 P. 177 (1914).
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servient to the paramount rights of appropriators on streams to
which such waters are presumptively tributary. And secondly,
upon a belief that senior ground water appropriators may severely
limit the beneficial uses in a basin by insisting upon the preservation of the natural water table. I believe these fears are groundless.
In the first place, a stream appropriator can restrain the pumping
of tributary ground waters only if he can show positive injury
to his rights from such use, Albia Idaho Land Co. v. Naf Irr. Co.
Generally such injury cannot be shown. The great lag between
percolation water diversions and their effect upon stream flow
is often so great as to postpone that effect until the critical season
for stream appropriators has passed. Moreover, in the principal
basins of the state where waters may fairly be presumed to be
tributary, geologists inform us that the recharge from seepage
is so great that little effect will ever be felt by the stream from
the intra-basin uses. If positive injuiy to a senior stream appropriator can be shown, however, I think we would all agree that his
right be protected.
With regard to the second objection, it is true that the great
majority of states have held the appropriator entitled to the lift
that existed at the time his appropriation was made. In Pima
18
Farms v. Proctor,
for example, the Arizona court preserved for
the senior the level of an underground stream "so that his means
of capture and diversion as originally installed would not be impaired or destroyed for his uses." But the existence of this right
need not restrict the total use from the aquifer, The Utah court
which recognizes appropriation rights to ground waters and in
particular this right to natural lift has reached a sensible compromise in Hanson v. Salt Lake City,19 where it permitted reductions in reservoir levels but required that subsequent appropriators
bear the added expense to the senior of bringing his water to the
surface.
In choosing between the four common law doctrines, our court
has no obligation to recognize that proprietary rights have vested
with the patents to overlying lands, but need only consider the
customs and best interests of the arid regions of the state. The
Supreme Court of the United States said in California-Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. 20 that following the
Desert Land Act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters
then a part of the public domain became publici juris, with the
right in each state to determine for itself to what extent the rule
of appropriation or the common law riparian rule should obtain.
For the future, it said, land should be patented separately from
water. The reasoning of this case was recently extended by the
New Mexico court, in Bliss v. Dority,21 and by a minority of the
"30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369 (1926).
" 115 Utah 404, 205 P. 2d 255 (1949).
" 295 U. S. 142, 55 S. Ct. 725.
2'55 N. M. 12, 225 P. 2d 1007 (1950).

DICTA

Jan., 1954

Arizona court in the second Bristor v. Cheatham 21case so as to
implement common law appropriation doctrines and thereby permit subsequent legislation to limit the pumper's rights. In the first
of these cases the defendant was denied a right to take water
from the Roswell basin for use on his overlying land without a
permit from the state engineer. His objection, that the appropriation statute deprived him of property rights in the water incident
to the title of his land, was disregarded, the court saying that he
never had a vested right to the water that could be adversely
affected by the water code. On first hearing of the Bristor v.
Cheatham case, the court followed the New Mexico lead notwithstanding earlier cases such as Howard v. Perrin23 to the effect
that the ownership rule obtained. The court said in part: "If rule
of ownership is adhered to, the legislature is shackled from enacting an underground water code to meet the present emergency."
Upon rehearing the court shifted back to the ownership view because of stare decisis and by its own admission has prevented the
legislature from limiting existing uses so far as is necessary to
halt a rapid decline in critical water tables, which decline has
amounted to 34 feet in Mariposa County since 1945. The priority
rule for ground waters is supported by reason, is prompted by
emergency conditions, and is consistent with the age-old water
policies of the state. To me, it is of critical importance to our water
program that we avoid the pitfall of the second Bristor case. In
place of submitting to claims of ownership made by domestic
users in an age when ground waters were plentiful, I hope our
courts, when adjudication of ground water rights are presented
to them, look to a rule, which they have a free hand to adopt, that
will permit such regulation of ground waters as will be adequate
to protect future supplies.
'75 Ariz. 227, 240 P. 2d 185, 255 P. 2d 173 (1953).
"8 Ariz. 347, 200 U. S. 71.
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REVISION OF WATER AND IRRIGATION
STATUTES
HATFIELD CHILSON, of the LovelanL Bar

I was requested to report to the Water Section on the changes
resulting from a revision of the statutes, so far as the same pertain to the statutes on water rights and irrigation.
Before going into the various changes, I think it would be
well to briefly remind you of the purpose of the revision.
In the 1951 Session, the Legislature passed an act for a revision of the statutes. In this act, in addition to setting up the Revision Committee providing for a Revisor of Statutes, the Legislature provided:
In the course of collating, compiling, editing and
preparing such statutes, the Revisor of Statutes, under
the supervision and direction of the Committee, shall
adopt a uniform system of punctuation, capitalization and
wording; eliminate all obsolete and redundant words;
correct obvious errors and inconsistencies, eliminate duplications and laws repealed directly or by implication; correct defective section structure in arrangement of the
subject matter of existing statutes; clarify existing laws
and such other similar matter as the Committee shall deem
proper. All of the foregoing shall be done in such form
and manner as to preserve the intent, effect and meaning of any and every such statutory provision.
This directive of the Legislature will, I think, explain practically all of the changes in the water rights statutes as a result
of the revision.
As you know, the 1953 Revised Statutes is not merely a compilation of the statutes but is in effect the law of the State of
Colorado. The 1953 Legislature, in enacting the Colorado Revised
Statutes of 1953, provided as follows:
The statutory law of the State of Colorado of a general nature as corrected, harmonized, collated, edited, revised and compiled in the certified Official Report of the
Committee on Statute Revision is hereby enacted as the
positive and statutory law of a general nature of the
State of Colorado.
Since the Revised Statutes, upon their publication, will be
the law itself rather than a compilation of the law as set forth
in the various Session Laws, the Chairman of the Water Section
thought it advisable that the changes made by the Statutes Revision Committee and adopted by the Legislature should be reported
at this meeting.
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The work of the Statutes Revision Committee and the Revisor
of Statutes made it relatively easy to check the changes which
have been made, for after each section of the Revised Statutes
the Revisor has noted the changes which have been made in each
section, or if no change was made, he so indicated.
It would serve no good purpose for me to attempt to go
through the various changes section by section. The value, if any,
of this report, I think can be best accomplished by classifying the
changes and giving certain specific examples.
The changes generally follow the directive of the Legislature
in 1951 and may be classified as follows:
1. The elimination of redundant words.
2. Correction of grammar, punctuation and sentence structure.
3. Changes to make references to previous sections and statutes more definite.
4. Changes to conform with Civil Service Amendment, Administrative Code and other legislation adopted after the passage
of the original sections.
5. Changes to coordinate various sections.
6. Repeal of sections which are obsolete or which had been
superseded by subsequent legislation.
THE ELIMINATION OF REDUNDANT WORDS

Changes of this type can best be illustrated by the change
made in Section 8 of Chapter 90, 1935 C. S. A. This section originally read, "Upon the refusal of the owners of tracts of land or
lands through which said ditch is proposed to run, to allow of its
passage through their property, the person or persons desiring to
open such ditch may proceed to condemn and take the right of
way therefor." (Italics supplied.) This was re-written to read
as follows: "Upon the refusal of the owners of tracts of land
through which said ditch is proposed to run, to allow its passage
through their property, the person desiring to open such ditch
may proceed to condemn and take the right of way therefor." The
two sections are exactly the same except in the original section
where it states, "the owners of tracts of land or lands," was rewritten to eliminate the words, "or lands," and later in the original
section where it says, "the person or persons desiring to open
such ditch," was changed to read, "the person desiring to open
such ditch." Obviously there is no change in the meaning of the
section, and the section was re-written to eliminate the redundant
words, "or lands" and "or persons."
This is typical of the changes to eliminate redundant words,
and in my casual checking of the changes to eliminate redundant
words, I found no instance which occurred to me that any change
in meaning had resulted.
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CORRECTION OF GRAMMAR, PUNCTUATION AND
SENTENCE STRUCTURE

This class of change consists largely of eliminating a string
of separate sentences which had been hung together by the word
"and," and separating them into separate sentences. In
several
instances proviso clauses which were hung onto the end of a section, following a semi-colon, were changed into separate sentences.
There are many changes of punctuation and grammar. Not being
a professor of English or grammar, I will have to take the word
of the Revisor that these changes are an improvement. Nevertheless, I found no instances where I felt the substance of the statute
had been changed or effected.
CHANGES TO MAKE REFERENCES TO PREVIOUS SECTIONS
AND STATUTES MORE DEFINITE

A good example of this is found in Section 11 of Chapter 90,
concerning the obligation of the owner of a ditch to permit others
to enlarge it, and which orginally read, "No person or persons having constructed a private ditch for the purposes and in the manner
hereinbefore provided, shall prohibit or prevent any other person
or persons from enlarging or using any ditch by him or them
constructed in common with him or them, upon payment to him
or them of a reasonable proportion of the cost of construction of
said ditch." (Italics supplied.)
This section of the statute wherein it states, "and in the manner hereinbefore provided," refers to a previous section of Chapter
90. In order to make the reference to the previous statute more
definite, this section was re-written to read in part as follows:
"No person or persons having constructed a private ditch for the
purposes and in the manner provided in Section 147-3-5, shall prohibit or prevent," etc. The reference to Section 147-3-5, of course,
is the section of the Revised Statutes which is referred to in the
original Section 11. In other words, throughout the revision, wherever reference is made to previous sections or previous legislation
or to other statutes, the Revisor has made this reference definite
by setting forth the specific section or sections of the Revised
Statutes which are referred to.
CHANGES TO CONFORM WITH AMENDMENTS AND LEGISLATION
ADOPTED AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE ORIGINAL SECTIONS

From time to time, over a long period of years, the Legislature has enacted statutes pertaining to the appointment of a State
Engineer, his deputies, Irrigation Engineers, Water Commissioners, etc. Many of these statutes were passed prior to the Civil
Service Amendment, an?, of course, in those instances where the
statutes were in conflict with the Civil Service Amendment, the
statute was superseded. The Revisor has re-written those sections
so that they now conform with the Civil Service Amendment. For
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example, the statute providing for the appointment of a State
Engineer, provided for his appointment by the Governor to serve
for a period of two years until his successor was appointed and
qualified. The State Engineer is now under civil service, and consequently the statute was re-written to provide that the Governor
should make the appointment in accordance with and subject to
the terms of the Civil Service Amendment.
Similarly, there were many statutes which provided for the
receipt and expenditure of funds, which were superseded by the
Administrative Code, and the statutes have been re-written to be
consistent with and comply with the Administrative Code. For
example, one statute provided that certain funds which should be
received should be paid to the State Treasurer. Under the Administrative Code, they are now paid to the Department of Revenue,
and the change was accordingly made.
Several changes were made in nomenclature. For example,
the persons performing the duties of what is now known as the
Irrigation Division Engineer, were originally referred to in the
statutes as Division Water Superintendents. To make the statutes
consistent, the Revisor has designated all such persons by their
proper title as Irrigation Division Engineers.
CHANGES TO COORDINATE VARIOUS SECTIONS

An example of this class of change is in Sections 131 and 132
of Chapter 90. Section 131 provides that any ditch company delivering water for pay shall keep water in the ditch from April
first until November first of each year. Section 132 provides that
the owner of any canal or ditch shall have the ditch ready to receive
water by April 15th of each year. The Revisor of Statutes changed
the date in Section 132 to April first to be consistent with the date
of April first used in Section 131.
REPEAL OF SECTIONS WHICH ARE OBSOLETE OR WHICH HAD
BEEN SUPERSEDED BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION

By the revision of the statutes there were many sections of
Chapter 90 which were repealed. I will not attempt to give you
in any detail what these sections pertain to, but a few examples
are as follows:
Sections 34 to 39, which relate to the Commissioners for the
Upper Colorado River Compact, and which were superseded by
an act passed in 1937. The same repeal provisions pertaining to
the Commissioners of the La Plata River, Lai amie River, Rio
Grande River, and others.
Sections 227 to 231, relating to the State Engineer, because
they are now governed by civil service law.
Sections 356 to 358, which were passed in 1891 for the survey
of Mesa County State Ditch, which was neither located nor built
and is obsolete.
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From a casual inspection of these various sections which were
repealed, I found nothing objectionable.
I might mention the chafige made by the Revisor in Section
79 of Chapter 90. Section 79 is the section of the statute authorizing the appropriation of water for storage. The construction
of this section was involved in the case of People v. Hinderlider,
90 Colo. 505, in which the Court held that a proper construction
of this section included the insertion of the word, "thereafter," in
the statute. Consequently, although the statute originally read,
"Persons desirous to construct and maintain reservoirs for the
purpose of storing water, shall have the right to store therein any
of the unappropriated waters of the state not needed for immediate use for domestic or irrigating purposes," the Supreme Court
stated that it should read, "the right to store therein any of the
unappropriated waters of the state not thereafter'needed for immediate use." Consequently, the Revisor of Statutes re-wrote the
section to include the word "thereafter" in accordance with the
Supreme Court's construction. This change, together with a few
changes in combining sections, appear to be the most radical
changes in the revision, and from my own inspection of the changes
I do not feel that the revision has changed the substance or meaning of the statutes as they existed prior to the revision.
However, I can conceive that some one or more of you, when
studying a particular problem under particular facts and circumstances, may come to the conclusion that some one or more of these
changes has changed the substance of one or more of these statutes.
Let me say, however, that it is my own opinion that the Revisor
has done a most excellent and painstaking job in attempting to
comply with the Legislature's mandate insofar as the water and
irrigation statutes are concerned. Assuming that the same thought
and attention was given to all of the statutes, and I am sure it
was, the Revisor and his Committee have accomplished a monumental task.

MY FATHER'S MISTRESS
EVERETT E. SMITH

Every lawyer, single or married, has a mistress-his profession. As people say, the law is a jealous mistress. I have occasion
to know. My father was a lawyer,. and his views on nearly every
subject were colored-I will not say distorted-by the whispered
persuasions of his mistress.
My father's professional duties permitted him the companionship of art (as well as literature), a boon denied to many busy
attorneys. There was a string attached, however; that his appreciation of works of art should be mixed with such speculations as
whether a particular statue should be considered a chattel or a
fixture. Thus, the contemplation of Rodin's. Thinker in weighty
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thought would lead to an absentminded comment that a heavy
statue of George Washington had been held real rather than personal property in an early New York case.
A client who paused to admire a print of Daumier which
decorated my father's law office might be rewarded by a generous
reference to the part which etchings created by Prince Albert
and Queen Victoria had played in the development of the law of
privacy. Whistler had produced masterpieces of painting, of course,
but he also had performed nobly in the witness box when crossexamined by an English advocate in a libel action brought against
the famous author and critic, John Ruskin. The critic had called
the artist impudent in asking 200 guineas for one of his paintings.
My father did not wholly share a friend's lament that the art
of Leonardo Da Vinci scarcely is represented in this country. He
was reminded of an interesting litigation concerning a painting
which the owner claimed was done by the hand which gave the
world the Mona Lisa. A well known art dealer had challenged that
claim in an interview with a newspaper reporter. In the action
for damages brought in New York by the enraged owner against
the dealer, the jury disagreed, but the judge took advantage of
an opportunity, which my father would have relished, to write
an essay giving his opinion on the law of the case.
My father's attitude toward art was not a personal idiosyncrasy merely. Other lawyers, to my knowledge, make the same bows
to their mistress when admiring, say, a portrait of a lovely lady
by Gainsborough. An incident which happened many years ago
illustrates this. Father and I were visiting a friend who practiced law in another city. Our host showed us the unfinished portrait of his daughter. There were a few remarks about the artist
and the picture's promised likeness to the subject. Then the two
good friends began to warm their passions in a dispute whether
the contract for the painting was for the sale of materials or for
work and labor.
Father was an inveterate visitor of museums and art galleries. It is only fair to say that he knew of the Barnes Foundation
and the Frick Collection before their names appeared in the law
reports. While Father's interest in such institutions did not depend on their contributions to legal lore, it certainly was heightened
by such circumstances. Justice Holmes' comparison of the Smithsonian Institution to the ark of the covenant intrigued him. The
litigation over the Smithsonian's Gellatly Collection enhanced the
delight which he always had taken in its enviable paintings by
Ryder and others.
When Justice Holmes wrote, in one of his renowned dissents,
"We have not that respect for art that is one of the glories of
France," he was speaking as one lawyer to another. The lavish
homage demanded by the lawyer's mistress, his profession, scarcely
permits a courtship of art.
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ANNOUNCEMENT OF 1954 CONVENTION OF
THE COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
There was an old woman who lived in a shoe. She had so
many lawyers she didn't know what to do. That, in a word, expresses the problem that has multiplied the grey hairs in the heads
of Colorado Bar Association Presidents of recent years and has
driven to near distraction the kindly and courteous managers of
the Broadmoor Hotel. A special committee was appointed to solve
the problem of reservations and assignment of rooms at the Broadmoor Hotel at the convention to be held next October.
It is an unfortunate fact that in recent years far more requests
for reservations have been received by the Broadmoor than could
be filled. The annual convention has attained a popularity and importance to the members of the Colorado Bar Association which
is most gratifying but which has led to a highly competitive scramble for rooms at the Broadmoor. A study of the records of the
past two or three conventions indicates, however, that much of
this competition is of the toe-in-the-door category and a great many
of the reservations made at the time of the announcement of the
convention dates have been cancelled at the last minute. It is thus
apparent that many reservations are being made by members
simply on the chance that they may attend the convention but
without any definite plan on their part to do so.
The 56th Annual Convention of the Colorado Bar Association
will be held on October 14 to 17, 1954, at the Broadmoor Hotel in
Colorado Springs. The following procedures will be strictly observed in the handling of reservations for this convention:
1. All requests for reservations must be sent to the Secretary
of the Colorado Bar Association, 702 Midland Savings Building
in Denver instead of to the Broadmoor Hotel.
2. No block reservations will be recognized but each member
of the Association desiring reservations must send in his own request by United States mail.
3. Each reservation request must be accompanied with a
deposit of $15.00. This deposit will not be credited to the hotel bill
(the Broadmoor has a policy against accepting advances on room
rent) but will cover a registration fee of $6.00 and pay for one
ticket each to the Friday and Saturday Luncheons ($2.50 each),
the Saturday night Banquet ($4.00), the President's Reception,
the Friday night entertainment and the Grand Ball on Saturday
night.
4. On March 1, 1954, all requests for reservations then in the
Secretary's office will be opened simultaneously. If the total number of requests accompanied by a proper deposit does not exceed
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the number of rooms which the Broadmoor can make available,
all will be filled. If such requests exceed the number of rooms
available, the rooms will be allocated to the various local Bar
Associations, pro-rated according to the membership of each Association. Associations having more requests for reservations than
rooms assigned may select by lot or otherwise the registrants to
be approved. Such selection would be made by the local Bar Association involved with the results certified to the Secretary of the
Colorado Bar Association.
5. Letters requesting reservations will be sent by the secretary
to the Broadmoor Hotel when approved in the above manner. The
hotel will be responsible for the actual assignment of rooms.
6. Deposits will be returned to those not receiving reservations
unless they desire to leave their request on file in the hope of obtaining a reservation cancelled by another. Those leaving their deposit
with the Bar Association Secretary will receive preference in the
assignment of cancelled reservations.
7. After a reservation is confirmed NO DEPOSIT WILL BE
RETURNED UNLESS A CANCELLATION IS RECEIVED
PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 14, 1954.
If this all sounds like a bookie's nightmare, please remember
that it is the only solution the Committee has been able to devise
which will minimize the possibility of discrimination and which will
give each member of the Colorado Bar Association an equal chance
at a reservaton.
Requests for accommodations at the Broadmoor Hotel will now
be received by the Bar Association Secretary.
No advance deposit will be required of members who do not
request reservations at the Broadmoor Hotel. Ample accommodations are available elsewhere in Colorado Springs and the Secretary will assist anyone desiring such facilities.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR CONVENTION
RESERVATIONS,
PETER H. HOLME, JR.,
JACOB S. SCHEY,
RAPHAEL J. MOSES.

Your contribution to the Colorado Bar Foundation today will promote the administration of justice in Colorado and the standards of
learning in your profession for generations to come. The corpus of
funds which the Foundation acquires cannot be invaded.

Jan., 1954

DICTA

37

INDEX TO VOLUME XXX
AUTHOR INDEX
Page

Barbary, George F., Social Ideals of Free Competition in . nti-Tri.t Lun'.... 253
Bonham, Robert G., Taxation Problems................................................................. 100
Burke, Arthur, M ore on Res Gestae.........................................................................
351
Butler, Sam , Taxation of Goodwill ...........................................................................
138
Calhoun, Fred, Expenses of Moving in Eminent Domain Cases..............
269
Carter, George S., The Expert on Foreign Law.................................
381
Charlton, Robert D., Pre-Trial Procedure.............................................. 371
Dirrim, Lysle R., Common Law Copyright.......................................................... 108
Duckworth, Edward G., The Tidelands Problem.............................
217
Form Standardization Committee, Qtiet Title Forms.........................................
39
279
Graham, Charles A., Employer Unfair Practices......................................................
Haines, Robert T., Marketable Title Acts ............................................ 423
Harden, Ralph B., One Year Review of Colorado Law ...................................... 470
Hoagland, Donald W., Introduction to Symposinm on Labor Law ............... 275
Hornbein, Phiip, Jr., Secondary Boycotts.....................................................
...... 298
Hutchinson, Dudley I., Sr., One Year Review of Colorado Law ..................... 460
Jameson, William J., The Organized Bar-What Lies Ahead................... 407
Keegan, Milton J., Canons of Ethics Adopted................................................. 317
Kehl, Leslie, When the Spoken Word Becomes a Libel ........................................
183
Kettering, C. Edgar, Bar Sponsored Bills Become Law ....................
187
Keyes, Geraldine R., Liability of Joint Tortfeasors.........................................
176
Keyes, Geraldine R., Case Comment-Denver v. Thrailkill................................ 266
King, Edward C., Pitfalls in the Administration of Estates................................ 195
King, Edward C., One Year Review of Colorado Law ........................
435
Koplowitz, Dolores, Case Comment-Bennetts Restaurant v. Inditstrial
Commission ............................................................................................ 307
Kurz, Edward P., Variations in Colorado and Federal Income Tax Lairs........ 24
Lennartz, Paul C., One Year Review of Colorado Law ........................
441
Long, Lawrence A., Report on Unauthorized Practice..................... 232, 388
Low Marian E., Division of Property in Separate Maintenance........................ 310
MacNeill, Earl S., Tax-Favored Pension Plans..................................................
144
Mason, H. Shields, Uncle Sam, Your Silent Partner................................. 235
McKinlay, Donald C., Massachusetts Rule in the Denver Cont.ii Cort........
96
Melville, Max D., Joinder of Criminal Charges.................................................... 117
M elville, M ax D., Corpus D elicti............................... .. .................. ...................... 202
Miles, Floyd D., Fabularis Qui Advocato .................................................................. 344
Mitchem, Allen P., One Year Review of Colorado Law ..........................................
449
Morris, Percy S., Appellate Procedure and the New Rules ............................. 1, 77
O'Neill, Terry J., A Thought on Slum Clearance...................................................
347
O'Neill, Terry J., Purposes of Colorado Bar Foundation................................ 397
Parks, Howard, Case Comment-Strickland v. Wysowatcky ............................. 77
Parraguirre, Lorin, When Spoken Work Becomes a Libel ............................... 183
Pfeiffer, John S., Master's Liability for Torts............................................... 166
Phillips, Orie L., Conduct of Lawyers and Judges.................................... 157
Quiat, Ira L., Bar Sponsored Bills Become Law............................................... 187
Saunders, Glenn G., One Year Review of Colorado Law ........................................
447
Schaetzel, Jacob V., Economic Status of Lawyers............................................... 209
Sears, Don W., Statutory Redemption in Colorado ..........................
79
Sears, Edwin M., On Qualifying Pension Plans......................................................
a4
Schuteran, Sidney E., Income Tax on Alimony .....................................................
263
Storke, Frederic P., Statutory Redemption in Colorado........................................
79
True, Edward L., Liability of Joint Tortfeasors..................................
176
Underwood, Arthur K., Employer Unfair Practices.............................................. 279

DICTA

Jan., 1954
Page

Van Cise, Philip S., Use and Misuse of Discovery Procedure................................
357
Vaughan, Robert 0., Comments on Rule 31, .................................
367
Waldeck, William G., Uranium Claims Staked on Prior Leasholds................... 56
Wallis, Gordon T., Tax-Favored Pensions for Self-Employed ............................ 144
Ward, William R., Agricultural Cooperatives and Anti-Trtst Lairs _...................245
Whiting, Kenneth R., Case Comment-Harris v. Ioeovetto ........................... .154
W hiting, Kenneth R., The Right to W ork....... ..................................................
303
Williams, Wayne D., Prohibited Union 1'r(ictices--------......------------.....................
289
Winner, Fred M., One Year Review of Colorado Law -------- _---------.................... 465
Zook, Keith H., Seniority As a Property Right ----- ----.- .
......................133

SUBJECT INDEX
Page

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CONTRACTS:
One Year Review of Colorado
One Year Review of Colorado
Law -------------------------------------------447
La w ........--.---................................
ANTI-TRUST LAW:
CRIMINAL LAW:
Agricultural Cooperative and
Delecti .......... ...............
Anti-Trust Laws .................... 245 Corpus
Fabularis Qui Advocato .................
Social Ideal of Free Competition
in Anti-Trust Law .................. 253 Joinder of Criminal Charges .......
BAR ASSOCIATIONS:
American Bar Association
Approved Law Lists ................... 72
Diamond Jubilee Meeting .............. 393
Organized Bar-What Lies Ahead 407
Colorado Bar Association
Articles of Incorporation of
Colorado Bar Foundation ........... 401
Bar Sponsored Radio Program ----74
Purposes of Colorado Bar
Foundation ............................ ..... 397
Report of Committee on Unauthorized Practice ...................... 388
Denver Bar Association
Addition to Bar Association Staff 422
Law Institutes ............................ 153
Officers and Committees, 1953-54.- 272
BOOK TRADERS'
CORNER .......... 72, 214, 354, 390, 406
CASE COMMENTS:
Bennett Restaurant v. Industrial
Commission .................
307
Denver v. Thrailkill .................. 266
Harris v. Iacovetto .................... 154
Strickland v. Wysowatcky........... 75
CONFLICT OF LAWS:
Expert on Foreign Law ............... 381
One Year Review of Colorado
Law ....................................
............ 449
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
One Year Review of Colorado
Law ..........................
456

470
202
344
117

DOMESTIC RELATIONS:
Division of Property in Separate
Maintenance ........................ 310
Income Tax on Alimony ................ 263
ELECTIONS:
One Year Review of Colorado
Law -................................
..... 458
EMINENT DOMAIN:
Expenses of Moving in Eminent
Dom ain ...................................

269

EQUITY:
One Year Review of Colorado
Law ................................................

444

INSURANCE:
One Year Review of Colorado
Law ------------------------------------.......
Thought For the Month .................

460
132

LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS:
Discrimination Because of
Union Activity .........................
Employee Pension Plans ...............
Employer Unfair Practices ............
Introduction to Symposium on
Labor Law ..........................
Prohibited Union Practices ............
Right to W ork, The .......................
Secondary Boycotts Under
Taft-Hartley Act ...............
Seniority As a Property Right ....

307
34
279
275
289
303
298
133

Jan., 1954

DICTA

LEGAL PROFESSION:
Action Against Unauthorized
Practice ..................................
232
Bar Admissions ........................... 370
Canons of Judicial Ethics .............. 333
Canons of Professional and
Judicial Ethics Adopted .............. 317
Canons of Professional Ethics .---318
Conduct of Judges and Lawyers.. 157
Economic Status of Lawyers ....... 209
Index to Canons of Judicial
Ethics .......
........ .....
....... 342
Index to Canons of Professional
E thics ..........................................
330
Law Institutes ................
...
153
Lawyers Oath ............................... 332
Organized Bar-What Lies Ahead 407
Report on Mes v. Khay ...........
391
Report on Unauthorized Practice.. 388
Tenth Judicial Circuit Conference 215
LEGISLATION:
Bar Sponsored Bills Become Law 187
LOCAL GOVERNMENT:
One Year Review of Colorado
Law ........
.............
............. 447
MINING LAW:
Uranium Claims on Oil and Gas
Leaseholds ......................
OIL AND GAS:
One Year Review of Colorado
L aw ................................................

56

441

PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS:
Common Law Copyright ................ 108
Taxation of Patents and Intangible Industrial Property ................ 100

PROPERTY:
Additional Real Estate Standards 431
A Thought on Slum Clearance ......
347
Marketable Title Acts ....................
423
One Year Review of Colorado
Law ...........................................
470
Statutory Redemption in
Colorado .....................................
79

SALES:
One Year Review of Colorado
Law ...........................................
470
STATUTES:
Lawyers to Examine Colorado
Revised Statutes, 1953 ................
243
TAXATION:
Goodwill and Its Federal Income
Tax Aspects ...............................
138
Income Tax on Alimony ................
263
Income Tax Laws ................ 24
Inheritance Tax Rules ....................
400
One Year Review of Colorado
Law ..........................................
447
Qualifying Pension Plans .............
34
Taxation Problems in Patents
and Intangible Property ............
100
Tax-Favored Pensions for
Self-Employed ......................... 144
Uncle Sam, Your Silent Partner.. 235
Variations in Colorado and
Federal Income Tax Laws ..........
24

TORTS:
Extension of Liability in
Tort Cases ....................................
132
Liability of Joint Tortfeasors ......
176
Master's Liability for Torts.........
166
More on Res Gestae ........................
351
One Year Review of Colorado
Law ...........................................
460
When Spoken Word Becomes
a Libel .......................................
183

TRUSTS:
PROCEDURE:
Massachusetts Rule in the
Amendments to Rules of
Denver County Court ..................
96
Civil Procedure .................. 16, 131
Prudent Man Rule ................. 107
Amendments to Rules of
One Year Review of Colorado
Supreme Court .............. 201,434, 446
Law ...........................................
Appellate Procedure and New
435
Supreme Court Rules ................. 1
WATER
PROBLEMS:
Changes in County Court Rules.. 387
One Year Review of Colorado
Comments on Rule 34 ............... .367
Law ...........................................
441
Expert on Foreign Law ...........
381
Tidelands Problem ..............217
One Year Review of Colorado
L aw -_---------.................................... 465
WILLS AND ESTATES:
Pre-Trial Procedure-Should It
One Year Review of Colorado
Be Abolished .................
371
Law ............................................
435
Use and Misuse of Discovery
Pitfalls in the Administration
Procedure ..................................
357
of Estates ....................................
195

In consideration of the subscription of others, I hereby pledge to the

COLORADO BAR FOUNDATION, INC.
702 Midland Savings Building
Denver 2, Colorado
a total of ----.. ----..........

..... .

... Dollars ($------------ ) payable as follows:

paid herewith and the remainder as follows:

$.....................

....
$--------..----------..-----o n .......................
$

o n ............................

(Date)
Signature ------.

.

(Date)
.

.

.

. . . ---------------D ate ......... ...............

MFG. COMPANY

AMERICAN

2714 Walnut St., DENVER 5, COLO.

ADAMS,
ritualrn

ARAPAHOE
and

l^811&llITiE

Back of Colorado Real Estate Investment Since 1898

V----Kl

HAVE YOU PAID YOUR DUES?

-1%

Feb., 1954

DICTA

NEW MEXICO'S ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LAW OF UNDERGROUND WATER
CHARLES D. HARRIS, of The Roswell, New Mexico Bar

As I see it, the principle guiding the western lawmakers is
how best to utilize our water resources and at the same time give
a reasonable protection to those who have property rights based
upon the use of water. In addition to the protection afforded the
water user, the community and the state also have an interest
in the most efficient use of water. Whereas the landowner may be
concerned with the problem of getting sufficient water for this
year's crop and for crops for the next few years, the community
and the state should be vitally interested in what will happen to
our irrigation economy 50 or 100 years hence.
The New Mexico ground water law, together with its administration, are of particular interest for all those concerned with
the ground water problem in the West. As was pointed out in the report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission,' "New
Mexico, while not the first state to enact ground water legislation,
has pioneered in this field in that its ground water administrative
statute, after having been declared unconstitutional and subsequently re-enacted in correct form, was the first of the western state
ground water statutes to be put into active operation and has set
the pattern for much of the subsequent legislation in that field in
the West." This is one field of law where the New Mexico lawyer
cannot go to other jurisdictions to get court decisions to uphold
his contention. With 21 years of experience under the 1931 ground
water code, New Mexico has as many court decisions on ground
water as any other state.
The first New Mexico statute, enacted in 1927, was declared
invalid by the New Mexico Supreme Court in the celebrated case
of Yeo v. Tweedy.2 While the court held the statute invalid because
it violated a constitutional prohibition against legislation by mere
reference to pre-existing legislation, the Court went on to hold that
the statute, while objectionable in form, was declaratory of existing law, was not subversive of vested rights of owners of lands
overlying the waters of an artesian basin, the boundaries of which
have been ascertained, and that the statute was fundamentally
sound. In arriving at the decision in this case, the Court stated:
We are here considering artesian basins, reservoirs
or lakes, the boundaries of which may be reasonably ascertained by surface investigations or surface indications.
Such boundaries of subterranean waters are the principal
'The Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission, Water
Resources Law, 1950, Vol. 3, p. 746.
234 NM 611, 286 Pac. 970 (1930).
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resources of the localities where they occur. Their employment to the best economy advantage is important to
the state. According to the correlative rights doctrine,
each overlying owner would have the same right-the
right to use whatever he saw fit. The right does not arise
from an appropriation to beneficial use, which develops
the resources of the state; it is not lost nor impaired by
non-use. Regardless of the improvements and investments
of the pioneers, later-comers or later-developers may claim
their rights. The exercise of those rights which have been
in abeyance will frequently destroy or impair existing improvements and may so reduce the rights of all that none
are longer of practical value and that the whole district
is reduced to a condition of non-productiveness. The preventive for such unfortunate and uneconomic results is
found in the recognition of the superior rights of prior
appropriators. Invested capital and improvements are thus
protected. New appropriations may thus be made only
from supply not already in beneficial use. Non-use involves
forfeiture. A great natural public resource is thus both
utilized and conserved.
At the 1931 session the present law was enacted. 3 The pertinent statutes are short and to the point and are contained in
three pages of the Annotated Statutes. Section 77-1101, provides
that bodies of ground water with reasonable ascertainable boundaries belong to the public and are subject to appropriation. The following section states: "Beneficial use is the basis, the measure and
the limit to the right to the use of the water described in this
action." The statute goes on to provide: "Existing water rights
based upon application to beneficial use are hereby recognized."
There was also a provision for forfeiture of rights after four
years' non-use. The administrative provisions of the act provide
that an applicant for a permit to appropriate must apply to the
State Engineer and that the State Engineer should cause to be
published a notice of such application in order that the public and
prior appropriators will be advised. Protestants have an opportunity to file objections and in such event the State Engineer conducts a hearing. Whether any protests have been filed or not, the
State Engineer shall grant the application unless he finds that
there is no unappropriated water or that the appropriation will
impair existing rights. Under the law as it has been administered
all appropriations, changes of water rights, changes of method of
use and changes in location or construction of the well are allowed
only after application to and permit from the State Engineer. By
this method the State has in one office all records affecting the
method and use of underground waters.
Until 1949, the State was hampered in its administration of
'New Mexico Lairs, 1931, 131 Stats. 1941 Ann. § § 77-1101 to 77-111.
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ground water law since there was no prohibition upon the well
drillers as such. Before 1949, an unscrupulous landowner could
drill or have drilled illegal wells and in the absence of a large
police force, the State and the prior appropriators had no effective
way to check on violators. The 1949 session of the Legislature
passed a well drillers law which provided that well drillers drilling
in the basins with ascertainable boundaries must have a license
issued by the State Engineer and post a bond with that official
in the sum of $5,000.00. 4 This law made it unlawful for an owner
to permit drilling except by a licensed driller and by rules and regulations the State Engineer has prohibited the well driller from
drilling unless the landowner has a permit issued by the State Engineer. This statute has proved to be of immeasurable value in
curbing illegal drilling.
For almost 20 years after the passage of the ground water
law of New Mexico, there was no serious court challenge to its
constitutionality. But in 1949 the entire act was again challenged
in the case of State v. DorityA The defendants claimed that they
acquired title to their land through patents from the United States
Government, that said patents did not reserve the water and that,
therefore, the defendants were owners of the land and the water
underlying the land conveyed. However, the Court held that since
the passage of the Desert Land Act of 1877, Federal patents of
land did not carry with them any title to the water. The Court
stated:
The Desert Land Act provided that all waters upon
the public lands except navigable waters were to remain
free for the appropriation and use of the public. It was
not intended to be taken literally that such water must
be upon the surface of the earth to be of such use. The
waters of underground rivers with defined banks have
always been subject to appropriation. We conclude that
all water that may be used for irrigation was reserved
by the Desert Land Act to be used beneficially by the public as provided by the laws of the arid states. No interest
in such waters was conveyed by United States patent.
The United States Supreme Court has always looked to
the laws and decisions of the state courts to determine the
extent to which the authority of the state over such water
has been exercised.
The Court also stated, "No right to the use of water from such
sources was obtained by its use by defendants in violation of law
nor can it be. The statutory method of securing such rights is
exclusive."
This has been a short summary of the ground water law in
New Mexico as set out in the cases and statutes. However, because
"New Mexico Laws, 1949, Ch. 178; Stats. 1949 Ann. § § 77-1116 to 77-1121.
55 N.M. 12, 232 Pac. 2d 140.
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of the fact that ground water law is of recent origin, there are
many problems facing the water administrators for which there
are little or no precedents in the cases or statutes. The first question that comes to mind in New Mexico is the status of underground waters which are not within basins as declared by the
State Engineer. The State Engineer in New Mexico has declared
certain areas as underground water basins. In many of these cases
the boundaries as declared by the State Engineer have not been
the same as the geological or hydrological boundaries of such
basins. What is the property status of such waters that are within
the hydrologic boundaries but are without the boundaries as declared by the State Engineer? In New Mexico we have assumed
that such waters belong to the public and are subject to appropriation but since the State Engineer has not assumed jurisdiction,
the statutory method of appropriation does not apply. This proposition is inferred in the two cases of Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District v. Peters.6 In this instance the defendant, Peters,
drilled a well within the hydrologic boundaries of the Roswell
Artesian Basin but outside the boundaries of the basin as declared
by the State Engineer. The defendant did not apply for a permit
under the statutory provisions of Section 77-1103. After the well
was drilled the Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District brought
suit to enjoin the use of the well. At the first hearing before the
New Mexico Supreme Court, the Court held that the Conservancy
District was a proper party plaintiff and sent the case back to the
District Court for a new trial. On appeal from the second trial the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that the burden of proof was
upon the Conservancy District to establish the amount of water
which owners of wells, existing at the time the Peters well tapped
the basin were legally entitled to use.
The Court went on to hold for the defendant on the grounds
that the plaintiff had not made a prima facie case. Two years later
the same court held in the Dority case 7 that rights to the use of
waters from such sources were not obtained by its use by defendants in violation of law nor can it be. The statutory method of
securing such rights is exclusive. Yet in the Peters case it was
conceded that the waters in question were public waters within
reasonably ascertainable boundaries and it was also conceded that
the defendants had not followed the statutory method of securing
such rights. In the Peters case the Court did not discuss whether
the defendant could acquire rights to appropriate public waters
without following the statutory procedure. The only distinction
between the Peters case and the Dority case is that the lands
involved in the latter case were within a basin as declared by the
State Engineer. Even though there is nothing in the statutes which
gives the State Engineer authority to declare underground basins,
it must be inferred that until the State Engineer assumes juris6

50 NM 165, 173 Pac. 2d 490 (1945); 52 NM 148, 193 Pac. 2d 418 (1948).
7ob. cit.
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diction, the appropriator is not required to follow statutory procedure and may appropriate water by application to beneficial use.
Property status of other ground water within the State is also
open to question from a strictly scientific point of view. I understand that any water found under the surface of the land must
be in some sort of basin. If this concept were followed, then for
all practical purposes all the waters in New Mexico would be
owned by the public. In Yeo v. Tweedy, 8 the Court held that the
statutes were merely declaratory of existing law insofar as waters
in basins with reasonably ascertainable boundaries. If such waters
have always belonged to the public, it would be just as reasonable
to assume that all waters in the State belong to the public.
In the Dority case, 9 the Court said, "The Desert Land Act
provided that all waters upon the public lands were to remain free
for appropriation and use of the public. We conclude that all
water that may be used for irrigation was reserved by the Desert
Land Act to be used beneficially by the public as provided by the
laws of the arid states." From this dicta it may be concluded the
Desert Land Act included all waters of the State.
The contrary view was expressed in the early case of Vanderwork v. Hughes.' The water controversy in that case was called
seepage water or spring water from unknown sources. The Court
held that the waters were not subject to statutory appropriation
and that the territorial engineer's jurisdiction was limited to the
public unappropriated waters named in the statute and did not
relate to waters held in private ownership. From this decision
it can be inferred that it is still possible to have private ownership
of water in New Mexico. In Hutchins' book on water rights in the
West,'1 he states with reference to New Mexico, "There appears
to be little basis for assuming that the rule of absolute ownership
of such other percolating water has been changed." In the writer's
opinion, all water within the State are public waters and are subject to appropriation.
Another related problem is the status of ground waters that
constitute part of the base flow or are tributary to a surface stream.
In Colorado, in the case of Nevins v. Smith 12 and Comstock v.
Ramsey 13 the Supreme Court of that state established the doctrine
that rights to the use of ground water tributary to a water course
are correlated with the right to the use of waters flowing in the
water course itself. The doctrine of prior appropriation governs
these several rights. This means that the first appropriator,
9

Ob. cit.

0b. cit.

1015

NM 439, 110 Pac. 567 (1910).

1'Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West, Miscellaneous
Publication No. 418 of U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, p. 237.
1286 Colo. 178, 279 Pac. 44 (1929).
" 55 Colo. 244, 133 Pac. 1107.
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whether he diverts from the stream itself or whether he intercepts
tributary ground water on its way to the stream, has the first
right and subsequent appropriators, whether they intercept the
ground water or divert from the surface stream, are junior in
order of priority. In other words, in the logical application of this
rule, the location of the point of diversion has no more bearing
upon the priority of tributary ground water than it has in the
case of priorities among appropriators who divert directly from
the stream.
The State Engineer of New Mexico has evidently adopted this
theory of correlation of surface and ground water insofar as the
waters of the Carlsbad Underground Basin are concerned. 1 4 In
that area he has closed the basin to further appropriation except
to owners of watei rights to the waters of the Pecos River who
may obtain permits to supplement their surface rights with ground
water. The rationale of this procedure is based upon the idea that
these waters are part of the base flow of the Pecos River and that
all of the water of the Pecos River has been appropriated.
The only New Mexico decision touching upon the inter-relationship between ground and surface water was in the case of the
El Paso and Rock Island Railroad Company v. District Court of
the Fifth Judicial District.15 The railway company instituted suit
in Lincoln County. In their complaint they set up their water
rights, alleged their validity and prayed for a general adjudication
of all water rights in the Benito stream system. The adjudication
suit was instituted under the New Mexico Adjudication Statute 16
which provided that "in any suit for the determination of a right
to use the water of any stream system, all those whose claim to
the use of such water is of record and all other claimants as can
be ascertained with reasonable diligence shall be made parties." This
section also provides "the court in which any suit involving adjudication of water rights may be properly brought shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions necessary
for the adjudication of all water rights within the stream system
involved."
During the pendency of the adjudication suit in Lincoln County,
appropriators from the Roswell Artesian Basin sought to enjoin
the railroad company's diversion of water on the grounds that
the surface waters that the railroad company was appropriating
were subversive of the superior rights of the artesian appropriators and that the surface waters of the Benito watershed contributed to the recharge of the Roswell Artesian Basin. The Supreme Court of New Mexico issued a Writ of Prohibition against
14

Manual of Rules and Regulations Governing the Drilling of Wells and the

Appropriation and Use of Underground Waters in Declared Basins of the State
of New Mexico (1951), Sec. IX, § F, p. 29.
36 NM 94, 8 Pac. 2d 1064.
"Laws of 1919, Ch. 131 § 3 amending Laws of 1917, Ch. 31 § 1.
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the Chaves County District Court on the grounds that the Lincoln
County District Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the adjudication of the stream system of Benito River and that the Roswell
Artesian Basin appropriators were proper parties to that adjudication suit since they claimed some right in the water involved.
Since the Lincoln County court had exclusive jurisdiction and the
artesian appropriators were proper parties, the Chaves County
court was without jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief.
Along the valley fill of the Rio Grande there is a considerable
amount of underground water that may be obtained. In 1948,
about 15,000 acre feet of water was pumped for municipal and
industrial use. Records show that there has been little lowering
of water levels and that pumping has not reduced significantly
the flood plain evapo-transpiration losses. Unless the pumped water
is salvaged from that waste, it is inevitable that the flow of the
river must be depleted. 17 The conclusions of a study conducted by
the United States Geological Survey in the Elephant Butte district are: "The ground water and surface water supplies are interdependent and ground water pumped in the Rincon and Mesilla
valleys does not represent an additional supply or new source of
water but rather a change in method, time and place of diversion
of the supplies already utilized." Is As is pointed out, all of the
pumping of the lower Rio Grande comes from ground water that
is a part of the base flow of the Rio Grande. No ground water
basin along the Rio Grande has been declared by the State Engineer. Most of the wells that have been drilled into the valley fill
have been used to supplement Rio Grande surface water. A question that may be the basis for future court battles is the status
of the water rights of the appropriators of this water from the
valley fill who do not have basic surface rights. If it is assumed
that this water is a part of the base flow of the river and if we
further assume that all of the surface water in the Rio Grande
has been appropriated, then it would appear that these junior
appropriators who do not have surface water rights are subject
to injunction suits. This again illustrates the fact that the law
makers and the courts have not realized the inter-relationshin
between surface and ground water. The law has considered each
of these types of water as being separate comnartments whereas
the hydrologists know that each is only part of the hydrologic cycle.
The critical condition of our water supplies in the West may well
cause the time lag between science and law to be fatal.
A recent court case in Chaves County raised the nuestion of
the relationship between surface and ground water. In the case
of State v. Lillard Owen,19 the State sought to enjoin the use of
Thomas, The Conservation of Ground Water. p. 153.
,s Conover, C. S., Ground-water Conditions in the Rincon and Mesifla Vaflies
and Adiacent Areas in New Mexico. U. S. Geol. Survey, Typed Sept., October 1950.
" Chaves County Cause No. 17109.
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ground water without permit from the State Engineer. The defendant claimed that he had a surface right from the Hondo River
and that junior appropriators of artesian water had caused his
surface supply to be diminished or dried up entirely. He further
contended that it was necessary for him to drill a well to protect
his rights. The District Court granted a temporary injunction on
the grounds that even though the defendant might change his
point of diversion from a surface to an underground source, he
would still have to have a permit from the State Engineer to affect
the change and, at the time of the hearing, the defendant did not
have such a permit. It is the State's position that the facts of that
particular case will not bear out the defendant's contention that
the artesian appropriators have impaired his surface rights. However, there are some streams whose flows have been affected by
ground water diversions. If prior appropriators along such streams
can prove that their rights have been impaired by junior artesian
diversions, then this could be the basis for some interesting water
law controversies and certainly would be the making of new
water law.
The biggest problem in the administration of ground water
law in New Mexico, at the present time, is that of applying the
doctrine of prior appropriation to ground water basins under storage conditions. For example, in the Lea County Basin, the hydrologists tell us that if the underground reservoir there were emptied,
it would take some 30 centuries to refill at present estimated rates
of natural recharge.2 0 The best estimate of the amount of annual
recharge to that basin is in the neighborhood of 1/ " per year. The
hydrologists also point out that under natural conditions the
amount of recharge and discharge were the same. The program
of irrigation in the High Plains area of New Mexico and Texas
has had negligible effect on the amount of discharge so that for
all practicable purposes the recharge and discharge in that area
have remained constant. Such areas are called storage reservoirs
and some hydrologists have pointed out that the appropriation of
water from such basins amounts to the same thing as mining water.
New Mexico law provides that the State Engineer shall, if he
finds that there is unappropriated water or that further appropriation will not impair existing rights, grant new permits. 21 The
question that I ask you to consider is how do we determine there
is unappropriated water under such conditions? Our ground water
laws have been based upon surface water concepts. On a surface
stream it would be easy to say that all the water is appropriated
when there is no water left to flow down the stream or, in other
words, we might say that a stream is fully appropriated when the
appropriation equals the amount of annual recharge, but in a
storage basin like Lea County, we could not utilize any of the
"Theis, C. V., ProgressReport on the Ground Water S-upply of Lea County,
New Mexico, New Mexico St. Engineer 11th Bien. Rept. (1935), p. 151.
" Laws of 1931, Ch. 131; Stats. 1941 Ann. § 77-1103 as amended 1943.
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water if we say that the basin is fully appropriated when the appropriation equals the amount of recharge.
In two recent cases in Lea County, now pending before the
District Court of Lea County, Cooper v. John H. Bliss, State Engineer," and Lawrence v. John H. Bliss, State Engineer,23 this problem was squarely before the District Court. In both cases the plaintiffs filed applications with the State Engineer to appropriate
ground water of the Lea County Underground Basin. The State
Engineer denied their applications on the grounds that there was
no unappropriated water and that additional appropriations would
impair existing rights. At the time of the trials the State Engineer testified to the effect that he considered that a basin such as
Lea County was fully appropriated when there was enough water
remaining in storage to allow the prior appropriators a reasonable
amount of water for a reasonable length of time. He explained
to the Court that there is no way that the water of a storage basin
can be utilized so that the appropriators will have a right to the
use of that water in perpetuity.
This problem is indeed a perplexing one. As a lawyer, I can't
say that I know the answer. It is one wherein the law makers
and the courts need the fullest cooperation from those who are
specialists in the science of ground water. Many of us who have
studied the problem feel that an irrigation economy should last
for at least 40 years. Forty years is usually considered as the
longest time for all farm loans. REA loans are amortized over
this period and this period of time has been commonly used for
payment under reclamation projects. It would appear that a lesser
period of time would not enable a farmer to make a substantial
investment and get a fair return on same. Also, the community
and the State should be considered with their investment in roads.
banks, schools, trading centers, gins, etc. I am wondering, and I
throw out for consideration, whether or not these economic factors
should be considered when the hydrologists talk about optimum
development. In any calculations involving the question of what
should be done with our tremendous ground water resources, we
should consider the aquifer characteristics so that we can utilize
the maximum amount of water over the maximum period of time.
In the High Plains area there is no problem of salt encroachment
and it appears to be a case where we can take the water out within
a relatively short time or extend the life of the basin over a greater
period of years. The hydrologists point out that under an ideal
program we would have spacings of wells and spacings of irrigated
lands. Under actual conditions this is hard to achieve because
of the variation in soil conditions and the variations in the landowner's desire to go in for irrigation projects.
An additional question raised by the Lea County cases in"Lea County Cause No. 9565.
" Lea County Cause No. 9979.
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volves the scope of review of the decisions of the State Engineer.
Section 77-601, related to appeal from the decision of the State
Enginer, states: " * * * The proceeding upon appeal shall be de
novo except evidence taken in hearing before the State Engineer
may be considered as original evidence subject to legal objection,
the same as if said evidence was originally offered in such District Court * * * ". As far as this writer can determine, there has
been no case in this jurisdiction or in any other jurisdiction involving the judicial scope of the review of a decision of any state
engineer. Can Section 77-601 be reconciled with Section 1 Article
3 of the Constitution of New Mexico which provides, "the powers
of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person
or collection of persons charged with the exercises of the powers
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in
this Constitution or otherwise expressly directed or permitted."
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court has not ruled upon
the scope of review of the decisions of the State Engineer, it has
ruled many times on this question with regard to other administrative agencies. From a review of the cases on this point it would
appear that the New Mexico Court is committed to the doctrine
that the courts may not overrule the acts of administrative officers
on matters committed to their discretion unless their actions are
unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or not supported by
24
evidence.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUN ITI ES
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is again employing Special Agents, who are law graduates, at a starting salary of $5,500
per annum. These are investigative positions with career opportunities and excellent retirement benefits at age fifty. Applicants
must be American citizens between the ages of twenty-five and
forty inclusive, with no physical defects and available for assignment anywhere in the United States or its territorial possessions.
Additional information may be obtained from the Denver office
of the FBI, Room 254, New Custom House, telephone AComa 5981.
A vacancy has been created by the resignation of Terry J.
O'Neill, secretary of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations
and Editor of Dicta. Lawyers with energy and administrative
ability are invited to apply at the bar associatiop office if interested
in filling this position.
"Seward v. D.&R.G., 17 N. M. 557; Seaberg v. Raton Public Service Company, 36 N. M. 59; Harris v. State Corporation Commission, 46 N. M. 352;
Transportation Company, Inc. vs. State Corporation Commission, 51 N. M. 59;
Yarbrough v. Montoya, 214 Pac. 2d 769.

